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Every man feels that perception gives him an invincible belief of the
existence of that which he perceives; and that this belief is not the
effect of reasoning, but the immediate consequence of perception.
When philosophers have wearied themselves and their readers with
their speculations upon this subject, they can neither strengthen this
belief, nor weaken it; nor can they show how it is produced. It puts
the philosopher and the peasant upon a level; and neither of them
can give any other reason for believing his senses, than that he finds
it impossible for him to do otherwise.'
Judging by common sense is merely another phrase for judging by
first appearances; and everyone who has mixed among mankind
with any capacity for observing them, knows that the men who place
implicit faith in their own common sense, are, without any exception,
the most wrong-headed and impracticable persons with whom he has
ever had to deal.2
It is better to be roughly right than precisely wrong.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Entering a room for the first time is often a revealing experience,
not so much for the raw newness-the materialization of something
from void-but for the interesting meeting of expectation and reality.
On the threshold, before our eyes adapt to the lights, the canvas of
our perception may seem to suggest the empty serenity of fresh white
gesso. But in truth we face a work in progress-the forms sketched in,
colors chosen, a gilt frame cut to size. Although it may all seem novel
as the image comes into focus, our first impressions are shaped not
only by what is actually there but also by what we expect to find.
1. THOMAS REID, ESSAYS ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS OF MAN 240-41 (1969).
2. John Stuart Mill, The Spirit of the Age, THE EXAMINER, May 1831, at 20.
3. This quip has been attributed to John Maynard Keynes. See, e.g., John Maynard
Keynes, at http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/John-Maynard-Keynes (last modified Feb. 5,
2005). The exact quotation and its original source are unknown.
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Entering the ceremonial moot courtroom at The Costs of Accidents4
Symposium last April, there were many things that might have caught
our attention-the architect's choice of crown molding, the law stu-
dents milling about at the entrance, the details of the Maryland state
flag hanging at the front-yet our gaze was necessarily focused on dis-
covering the main actors of the upcoming drama-the cast whose
names appeared on the program-and, in particular, the two stars.
And there they were at the front, backs to us, side by side, just as we
had pictured it in our heads: Judge Richard Posner on the right and
Judge Guido Calabresi on the left.
That the seating plan should feel so cosmically correct is no mys-
tery. Calabresi and Posner are among the small group of scholars
credited with launching the law and economics movement, and within
that elite cadre they are often held up, as they were at the Symposium,
as the bookends to the approach: Posner on the right; Calabresi on
the left.5
While, as we will discuss later, good arguments can be made to
contest these labels, and seemingly more appropriate embodiments of
the liberal and conservative scholar can be asserted, we focus on Cala-
bresi and Posner, in part, because of the salience of their perceived
ideological leanings. The "left" and "right" labels seem to attach to
Calabresi and Posner, respectively, without need for further justifica-
tion or explanation. When Calabresi is mentioned in scholarship to-
day, it is often with the explanatory aside "a foremost liberal law and
economics scholar,"6 just as Posner's image is readily conjured up with
the phrase-'the conservative law and economics guy."7
Moreover, we focus on Calabresi and Posner because they are
commonly offered as the contrasting exemplars of two modes of law
and economics. Robert B. Seidman's summation is typical: "The Law
and Economics school has evolved over time into two clearly defined
wings, the first conservative, as exemplified by Professor Posner, an-
4. See GUIDO CALABREsi, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
(1970) [hereinafter THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS].
5. Posner and Calabresi are widely held to be among the handful of scholars whose
work initiated, and contributed to the success of, the modern law and economics ap-
proach. In 1991, they were recognized at the inaugural meeting of the American Law and
Economics Association as such, along with Henry Manne and Ronald Coase. See Francesco
Parisi, Palgrave on Law and Economics: A Review Essay, 20 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 395, 397-98
(2000) (also pointing out that Posner and Calabresi are identified as two of the ten "found-
ing fathers" of law and economics profiled in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the
Law).
6. AnthonyJ. Sebok, The Fall and Rise of Blame in American Tort Law, 68 BROOK. L. REv.
1031, 1039 (2003).
7. Richard H. Underwood, The Professional and the Liar, 87 Ky. L.J. 919, 978 (1999).
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other liberal, exemplified by Professor Calabresi."' Numerous articles
have focused on the political division within law and economics with
Posner representing the conservative camp and Calabresi the liberal.9
Indeed, the conservative/liberal divide is often cast as between the
Yale and Chicago Schools, with Calabresi and Posner as their respec-
tive leaders.1"
Finally, we focus (in that room and in this Article) on Calabresi
and Posner because of their significance to law and economics and
their importance to this Symposium. They are co-leaders of a shared
movement-a new way of looking at the law and, in particular (at least
initially), tort law. Where Calabresi would "minimize costs," Posner
would "maximize wealth." Both were, in their own terms, calling on
scholars and policymakers to do the same thing: to take seriously the
insights and approach of neoclassical economics in analyzing pol-
icy 1 -a project that one legal historian calls the "Calabresi-Posner Re-
search Programme."1 2
To be sure, Calabresi may not be, in the words of Wayne East-
man, "the closest analogue to Posner on the liberal side,""5 and Pos-
ner is by no means the conservative mirror image of Calabresi. Still,
the fact that so many scholars and commentators perceive them as
significant leaders of a single intellectual movement and as represent-
ing two ends of an imagined spectrum within that movement suggests
8. Robert B. Seidman, Justifying Legislation: A Pragmatic, Institutionalist Approach to the
Memorandum of Law, Legislative Theory, and Practical Reason, 29 HI-tv. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 48-49
(1992) (footnotes omitted).
9. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private Autonomy: Lon
Fuller's "Consideration and Form," 100 COLUM. L. REv. 94, 174 n.282 (2000) (placing Posner
on the right of the political continuum and Calabresi on the left); George L. Priest, Henry
Manne and the Market Measure of Intellectual Influence, 50 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 325, 328
(1999) (suggesting that debate over the importance of efficiency between Calabresi and
Posner can be understood as a battle between the "ultra liberal" and the "conservative");
Gerald B. Wetaufer, Systems of Belief in Modern American Law: A View from Century's End, 49
Am. U. L. REv. 1, 36-38 (1999) (suggesting a divide within law and economics between the
conservative school headed by Posner and Frank Easterbrook and a more progressive
school led by Calabresi and others).
10. See, e.g., Mitu Gulati & Veronica Sanchez, Giants in a World of Pygies? Testing the
Superstar Hypothesis with Judicial Opinions in Casebooks, 87 IowA L. Rv. 1141, 1167-68 (2002)
(comparing the "Yale/progressive brand of Law and Economics analysis used by Calabresi"
with the "Chicago/conservative version espoused by Posner and Easterbrook" as a poten-
tial way to understand the choice of opinions for casebooks).
11. For further discussion of the impact of Calabresi and Posner on tort theory and
policy, see James R. Hackney Jr., Law and Neoclassical Economics: Science, Politics, and the
Reconfiguration of American Tort Law Theory, 15 L. & HisT. REv. 275 (1997).
12. James R. Hackney Jr., Law and Neoclassical Economics Theory: A Critical History of the
Distribution/Efficiency Debate, 32 J. Socio-EcON. 361, 362 (2003).
13. Wayne Eastman, Telling Alternative Stories: Heterodox Versions of the Prisoners' Dilemma,
the Coase Theorem, and Supply-Demand Equilibrium, 29 CONN. L. REv. 727, 728 n.2 (1997).
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that there is something to be gained from looking more closely at
what lies behind the associations.
A goal of this Article is to describe one major source of those
ideological labels in order to shed some light on what it means to hold
Calabresi up as the liberal founding father and Posner as the con-
servative. In the following pages we argue that the substance of this
division-or, perhaps, put differently, the origin of our subconscious
seating plan-lies in the different ways Calabresi and Posner see the
world, in particular how they make causal attributions for behavior.
The implications of our arguments go well beyond the topics of this
Symposium. As the Conclusion indicates, and as our future work will
demonstrate, such attributional distinctions and labels are common to
all major policy debates.
A. Critical Realism and the Dispositionist Spectrum
To help make sense of Calabresi's and Posner's differing perspec-
tives, this Article adopts a critical realist approach. Critical realism is a
legal-theoretic method that is based on first establishing a realistic ac-
count of the human animal, and only then turning to analysis and
theory. Instead of building policy off of an intuitively appealing
model of the human actor, critical realism looks to social scientific
disciplines devoted to understanding how humans interact with and
make sense of their environment-most significantly, social psychol-
ogy and related disciplines-and to the practices of institutions de-
voted to understanding, predicting, and influencing people's
conduct-particularly market practices.14
Some examples, and some of the more detailed implications, of
the critical realist approach have been examined in other work.1 5
14. For a fuller description of critical realism, see Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The
Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Chaiacter, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and
Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 129 (2003) [hereinafter The Situation], and Jon Hanson &
David Yosifon, The Situational Character: A Critical Realist Perspective on the Human Animal, 93
GEO. L.J. 1 (2005) [hereinafter The Situational Character].
15. Other pieces in this project include the sources cited in the previous footnote, as
well as Adam Benforado, Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, Broken Scales: Obesity and Justice in
America, 53 EMORY L. REV. 1645 (2004) [hereinafter Broken Scales]; Ronald Chen & Jon
Hanson, The Illusion of Law: The Legitimating Schemas of Modern Policy and Corporate Law, 103
MICH. L. REv. 1 (2004) [hereinafter Illusion of Law]; Ronald Chen &Jon Hanson, Categori-
cally Biased: The Influence of Knowledge Structures on Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REV.
1103 (2004) [hereinafter Categorically Biased]; Adam Benforado &Jon Hanson, Naive Cyni-
cism: Some Mechanisms of Dispositionism and Other Persistent Attributional Errors
(2005) [hereinafter Naive Cynicism] (work in progress, on file with authors); Ronald
Chen, The Illusion of Ethics: The Legitimating Schemas of the Legal Profession (2005)
(work in progress, on file with author);Jon Hanson, Ana Reyes & Dan Schlanger, Attribu-
tional Positivism: The Naive Psychology Behind Our Laws (2005) [hereinafter Attribu-
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This Article focuses primarily on the "fundamental attribution error":
our proclivity to ascribe the vast majority of our actions to disposition-
based choice and to ignore the more significant role played by situa-
tional forces-unseen or underappreciated features in our environ-
ment and in our interiors. Although that perceptual proclivity seems
to be hard-wired in the human animal, the strength of our disposition-
ism varies across cultures, individuals, and situations (again, interior
and exterior).
A basic claim of this Article is that when scholars invoke Posner as
the prototypical conservative legal economist and Calabresi as the pro-
totypical liberal one, their categorizations are being driven largely by
Posner's relative dispositionism and Calabresi's relative situationism."
6
tional Positivism] (work in progress, on file with authors);Jon Hanson & Adam Wright, In
the Driver's Seat: Why Promoting Dispositionism Is Good Business (2005) [hereinafter In
the Driver's Seat] (work in progress, on file with authors).
16. The term "relative" here is significant. Posner is by no means the most disposition-
ist among law and economics scholars. The work of some of the other founders of the
field, such as Robert Bork, Henry Manne, and George Priest, are arguably even more dis-
positionist. Nor are we claiming that Posner is incapable of seeing matters from a situa-
tionist perspective. Indeed, he has been criticized by a number of his peers for being too
situationist in some contexts, particularly, we would argue, where his situation encouraged
it. Posner's positive theory did not, after all, seek to reverse the situationist trend of tort
law during the 1960s and 1970s, though his focus was dispositionist and he clearly did not
favor expanding the situationist trend. See infta Part II.B.1. In fact, because of his
nonreformist conclusions, several of his fellow conservatives were quite upset that he would
have devoted himself to legitimating the law as it was, given that it was moving in the
situationist direction.
Libertarians like Richard Epstein and Peter Huber, and efficiency-oriented scholars,
such as George Priest and Paul Rubin, have all criticized Posner's positive theory as part of
their more general critique of tort law. Still, these same critics otherwise embraced disposi-
tionism. For a summary of these arguments, see Steven P. Croley &Jon D. Hanson, Rescu-
ing the Revolution: The Revived Case for Enterprise Liability, 91 MICH. L. REv. 683 (1993)
[hereinafter Rescuing the Revolution]. See also, e.g., PETER W. HUBER, LIABIIITY. THE LEGAL
REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988); Richard A. Epstein, The Unintended Revolution
in Product Liability Law, 10 CARnozo L. REv. 2193 (1989); George L. Priest, A Theory of the
Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297 (1981). Their biggest complaint concerning
Posner's work was in the products liability context, where Posner claimed that, upon closer
examination, consumers might be optimistic in estimating small-probability product risks.
Croley & Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution, supra, at 737-38; see WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICH-
ARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAw 280-84 (1987). Posner's critics all
assumed that consumers were adequately informed in that context, as well, and empha-
sized the need to treat products liability as a contractual setting where well-informed con-
sumers negotiated to protect their own interests and sellers competed to make consumers
happy on every dimension. Croley & Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution, supra, at 715-21 (sum-
marizing this "contractarian" position). To the extent that Posner was interested in gain-
ing a more realistic view of the human animal in respect to products liability, and to the
extent he was willing to challenge the rational-actor model there, he demonstrated a situa-
tional sensitivity.
As his critics underscored, however, Posner's momentary nonconservative (relatively
situationist) conclusions reflected not an unbiased pursuit of the truth, but an analysis
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The dispositionist-situationist divide is, we argue, a key difference, and
perhaps the key difference, between the two founding fathers and the
two branches of law and economics with which they are associated.
We spend some time below investigating Calabresi's and Posner's
unique individual situations, which we believe go some distance to-
wards explaining their relative situationism and relative disposition-
ism, respectively. Our main interest, however, is in the divergent
directions Calabresi and Posner represent within law and econom-
ics.17 Since our focus is on the distinct examples that they offered to
an emerging field, we will concentrate on their early work and will
spend little time sorting through or analyzing later pieces in which
their views may have shifted.'"
As we will suggest, Calabresi stands as a relative situationist in a
particularly dispositionist school of thought. Indeed, Posner's rela-
tively dispositionist approach has dominated law and economic schol-
arship since the late 1970s. And although it is primarily the focus of
other work,'" we will argue briefly below that because of its greater
sensitivity to situation, Calabresi's exceptional outlook and approach
has hampered his ultimate influence."z
severely distorted by a prior allegiance to the economic positivism theory that launched his
career. He concocted an efficiency explanation for strict products liability, they claimed,
precisely because he was committed to the idea that the common law is, on the whole,
efficient. The way that critics called on dispositionist common sense to discredit Posner's
situationist understanding and accused him of a vested interest is a demonstration of naive
cynicism, the topic of related work. See Benforado & Hanson, Naive Cynicism, supra note
15.
17. Our purpose is not to attempt to categorize Posner and Calabresi, but rather their
approaches. Where we focus on them as individuals, as we do in Part II.B, it is to under-
stand some of the situational factors that we believe informed the directions they staked
out.
18. We also focus mostly on Posner's and Calabresi's tort-related work-the work that
is most commonly associated with the origins of law and economics-and their then-bud-
ding careers. SeeJon D. Hanson & Melissa R. Hart, Law and Economics, in A COMPANION TO
THE PHILOSOPHIY OF LAw AND LEGAL THEORY 311 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996) (discussing
Posner's and Calabresi's early contributions to the economic analysis of tort law). Al-
though we suspect that an investigation of both men's approach to judging would be re-
vealing, given that Calabresi and Posner were not appointed to the bench until well after
formulating their legal economic theories and given the particular constraints on, and
situational influences of, judicial decisionmaking, such a project is too complex to be com-
pleted adequately in the time and space at hand. With the exception of Posner's Indiana
Harbor opinion-which we highlight as particularly connected to Posner's early tort schol-
arship and to current tort pedagogy-we avoid their legal decisions altogether. See infra
notes 53-58 and accompanying text (analyzing the Indiana Harbor decision as an example
of Posner's dispositionism).
19. See Benforado & Hanson, Naive Cynicism, supra note 15.
20. For a more complete description of the dispositionism of economics, law and eco-
nomics, and most legal theory, see authorities cited supra notes 14-15.
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B. The Connection Between Conservatism and Dispositionism
1. Close Ties.-One goal of this Article is to explore a division
within law and economics, the one often understood as the divide be-
tween the liberal Calabresian school and the conservative Posnerian
school. Again, that divide, we believe, is the consequence of contrast-
ing attributional tendencies that have become linked to, and at times
mistaken for, ideology. Because we describe in detail elsewhere the
connections between conservatism and dispositionism, on the one
hand, and liberalism and situationism, on the other,"1 we only offer a
brief summary here.
There are two main connections between our familiar political-
orientation bipolarity and the situationism-dispositionism divide.
First, dispositionist attributional schemas, highlighted below, have
much in common with prototypically conservative schemas. For in-
stance, the dominant dispositionist-actor model assumes that people
have stable preferences and make willful choices based on those pref-
erences.22 That perception shares much with conservative presump-
tions that, for example, "people are poor because they are lazy, do not
improve themselves, cannot manage money, and abuse drugs or alco-
hol."23 Moreover, "[t]he conservative dispositional attributions imply
that poor people have a controllable predisposition to stay poor.
24
They are poor, more or less, by choice. Second, some of the motives
(and other hard-to-see situational forces) that frequently lead to a dis-
positionist worldview are, likewise, often responsible for pushing peo-
ple toward conservatism. Individuals who are uncomfortable with
ambiguity, who have a strong need for closure, and who feel a height-
ened sense of threat, will be drawn more strongly to schemas, concep-
tions, and worldviews that seem to eliminate ambiguity, provide
closure, and reduce threat. Such individuals will be drawn to diposi-
tionism and conservatism. Or it may be more accurate to say that they
will be drawn to dispositionism and, therefore, to conservatism. In
Parts II.B.3 and II.B.5 of this Article, dedicated to Calabresi's and Pos-
ner's interior situations, we consider some of the specific motivations
that social scientists exploring political psychology have identified.
21. See Benforado & Hanson, Naive Cynicism, supra note 15.
22. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra note 14.
23. SUSAN T. FIsKE, SOCIAL BEINGS: A CORE MOTIVES APPROACH TO SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
98 (2004) (citing G.S. Zucker & B. Weiner, Conservatism and Perceptions of Poverty: An Attribu-




2. The Enigma of Richard Posner.-Describing Posner as the "con-
servative" to Calabresi's "liberal," as we are doing, is sure to raise some
eyebrows. Although Posner is often called a "conservative" 2 5
-in par-
ticular, due to his hearty embrace of free market ideals2 6-the desig-
nation is sometimes disputed. 27 As we noted earlier, among other
things, Posner favors strict products liability, a concept that the typical
conservative is likely to balk at,28 and many of his ideas aboutjurispru-
dence are similarly leftish.29
Understandably, therefore, Posner often seems to see himself as
removed from political associations altogether. ° In The Problems of
Jurisprudence, he states, "[m]y position may seem boringly centrist, but
it will provoke both the true centrists in the profession, who want very
much to believe that law is autonomous and apolitical, and the politi-
cal activists who want to move the law sharply to the left or to the
right."
3 1
Our response to those observations is twofold. First, if we take
the interior motivations and aitributional schemas of "conservatism"
offered up by George Lakoff and John Jost and his colleagues, dis-
cussed in Part II.B.3-as opposed to vague lay meanings of the term-
25. As Richard Bostan writes, "The reputation of Richard Posner among law professors
of the Left, its measure being taken from published and casual comments, might not be
any blacker if he boiled babies in their own blood and ate them." Richard Bostan, The
Tempting of Richard Posner, 2 INDEP. REv. 255, 255 (1997).
26. See, e.g., Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics oftheBaby Shortage,
7J. LEGAL STUD. 323, 339 (1978) (suggesting that the selling of babies should be regulated
less stringently than it currently is, given the high demand and low supply).
27. See Bostan, supra note 25, at 269 ("Posner's views about the judiciary clearly put hisjurisprudential position nearer to the camp of the Left than of the Right."); Mark M. Ha-
ger, The Emperor's Clothes Are Not Efficient: Posner'sJuriprudence of Class, 41 Am. U. L. REv. 7,9(1991) ("[T]here are probably judges who would be much worse than Posner on many
issues progressives hold dear. I see no reason to predict Posner would swing far to the
right on many issues more often than would typical conservative centrist jurists. In fact,
Posner's temperamental and intellectual contrariness might even take the form of some
sharp progressive departures from conservative centrism."); Sanford Levinson, Strolling
Down the Path of the Law (And Toward Critical Legal Studies?): The Jurisprudence of Richard
Posner, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1221, 1233 n.60 (1991) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
PROBLEMS OFJURISPRUDENCE (1990) [hereinafter PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE]) ("Posner's
newest work [ The Problems ofJurisprudence] will be much more happily embraced by the left
than by many of his mundane political allies on the right.").
28. See supra note 16.
29. See Graham Lea, Who the Heck Is... Judge Richard Posner?, THE REGISTER, Nov. 22,
1999, at http://www.theregister.co.uk/1999/11/22/who-theheckis.,judge/.
30. See Hager, supra note 27, at 8 ("Posner goes to considerable lengths to disclaim
identification as an ideologue of any sort.").
31. POSNER, PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 27, at 32; see also Hanson &
Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra note 14 (discussing Posner's claim that positive law
and economics has no "political valence").
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Posner's ideology seems quite consistently conservative, particularly as
compared to Calabresi. Second, even if Posner defies classification on
the liberal-conservative scale, he is certainly dispositionist (particularly
as compared to Calabresi).
Thus, although Posner may occasionally reach policy conclusions
that are associated with the left, he usually gets there by taking a dis-
positionist route. This point is lost on many commentators. Take, for
instance, much of the discussion over Posner's opinions on the role of
a judge.32 Many writers seem eager to contrast Bork and Posner on
the issue, without seeing the similarities between the two." According
to Posner, Bork stands for "militance and dogmatism," while he stands
for rationality, common sense, and pragmatism.34 What is missed is
the fact that both Posner and Bork are strong dispositionists, confi-
dent that their views of the world are correct.15 Posner attacks Bork
for suggesting "slavish obeisance to the [Constitution's] framers' every
metronome marking"36 at the same time that he moves with unwaver-
ing obedience to the regular ticking of his own timepiece-an inter-
nal one that sounds so much like his heart beating that he does not
notice it. Both men have a rigid schematic way of looking at things;
Posner's touchstone is just not on display at the National Archives.3
Though Posner may bridle at being called "conservative," we sus-
pect that he would readily accept our calling him a dispositionist.3 s
32. See POSNER, PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 27, at 138-41 (discussing
proper judicial behavior in implementing government policy and rejecting "original mean-
ing" constitutionalism).
33. See, e.g., Bostan, supra note 25, at 256. Bostan notes:
Fond though Posner is of free enterprise, his jurisprudence is distinctly at odds
with the jurisprudence on which conservatism smiles....
... The role of courts and howjudges ought to perform their office, every bit
as important in jurisprudence as philosophy of law, are issues where there can be
said to be a specific conservative position, an orthodoxy with which Posner is out
of sync.
Id.
34. Richard A. Posner, Bork and Beethoven, 42 STAN. L. REv. 1365, 1369 (1990) [herein-
after Bork and Beethoven].
35. In some ways, this oversight is predicted by social psychology. Differences, like dis-
positions, are salient, while similarities, like situation, are obscure.
36. Posner, Bork and Beethoven, supra note 34, at 1380.
37. Thus, Posner may be right that, in general, dispositionism should be expected to
be stronger in formalists than in pragmatists. E-mail from Richard Posner, to Jon Hanson
& Adam Benforado (Nov. 1, 2004) (on file with authors). Nonetheless, we believe he is
incorrect to suggest that pragmatists are somehow immune to dispositionism.
38. Of course, as a dispositionist believing in the power of human agency, Posner
seems to believe that he made a situation-free choice to be a dispositionist. By way of exam-
ple, after reviewing an earlier version of this piece, he urged us to "acknowledge the possi-
bility of simple models as a methodological choice, personality-independent." Id. We
hereby acknowledge that possibility, but think it far less likely to occur than he seems to,
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And well he should. It is the foundation, as we will investigate below,
of much of his writing.39
II. LAW AND ECONOMICS: SITUATIONIST CALABRESI VERSUS
DISPOSITIONIST POSNER
Over the last thirty-five years, law and economics-like neoclassi-
cal economics and classical liberalism before it-has been dominated
by a dispositionist conception of the human animal.4" The individual
is presumed to be an independent, choice-making agent whose acts
both satisfy and reveal a set of underlying preferences. Overall, legal
economists have paid little notice to the lack of realism in their under-
lying, simplifying assumptions. Rather, focus has remained on the
most salient actors in each area of analysis-often the party injured or
"the injurer"-with the less obvious actors, systems, and processes
often ignored. The goal has been to create straightforward models
that seem to lead to clear policy conclusions. Those models often
"make sense" of existing arrangements and, correspondingly, mini-
mize considerations that might raise doubts about the legitimacy of
the system-for instance, that the law is itself a legitimating cover in
the service of inequitable allocative and distributional effects.4"
Moreover, within the movement there has been little awareness
that the success of law and economics as a theory may itself be driven
by situational factors and, in general, even critics of the approach have
assumed that its dominance has occurred through a fair marketplace
of ideas.42
even among those who perceive themselves to have consciously chosen, based solely on the
merits. As we discuss below, the urge to characterize behavior as rationally chosen, even
when confronted with evidence that situational factors may be determinative, suggests
strong dispositionism.
39. See infra Parts II.A.l.a, II.A.2.a (discussing the dispositionist aspects of Posner's
scholarship).
40. For a more complete discussion of that history, see Hanson & Yosifon, The Situa-
tional Character, supra note 14.
41. See Chen & Hanson, Illusion of Law, supra note 15; Ronald Chen &Jon Hanson,
Distribution Versus Efficiency: Missing the Taste of the Pie (2005) [hereinafter Distribu-
tion Versus Efficiency] (work in progress, on file with authors).
42. See generally Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 14, at 134-39. The work ofdispositionist legal economists was not only more attractive to some scholars than the situa-
tionist alternative, it was also highly encouraged by forces outside of legal academia. See id.
at 229-31 (presenting the hypothesis that strong institutional forces operate to reinforce
dispositionist tendencies). In part, Calabresi and Posner present especially interesting case
studies because their seminal work comes in the area of tort law, an area that has been a
major battleground in which pro-commercial and pro-dispositionist influences have suc-
ceeded in shifting the debate. See David C. Johnson, Commonweal Institute, The Attack on
Trial Lawyers and Tort Law, Oct. 1, 2003, at http://www.commonwealinstitute.org/reports/
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Against this backdrop, this Part begins to explore what set Cala-
bresi apart from the dispositionist mainstream within law and eco-
nomics, embodied by Posner,43 and what made his view of tort law
relatively situationist.
A. Contrasting Posner's and Calabresi's Attributional Perspectives
We have claimed that the ideological bookends of law and eco-
nomics are separated mostly by their contrasting attributional tenden-
cies. To support that claim, we need to first determine how to go
about comparing scholars along the dispositionist-situationist contin-
uum. Although there are numerous points of comparison, we will
concentrate on four of the most central: the model actor (what moves
the person subject to the law?); the goal schema (what moves the
law?); the attributional schema (how important are situational influ-
ences?); and the lawmaker schema (what moves the lawmaker?). 4"
tort/tortreport.html (arguing that politically conservative groups and business interests use
media, think tanks, and grassroots organizations to gain support for tort reform in order to
limit constraints on corporations and to achieve a general move to the right in the United
States). Calabresi's work, and that of the situationally sensitive legal realists who came
before him, indicates the direction in which scholarship was going before the concerted
pro-commercial efforts to deeply capture our perceptions and conceptions of tort law. We
return to this point in more detail in work now in progress. See Benforado & Hanson,
Naive Cynicism, supra note 15.
43. It is important to note that, in other ways, Posner does not embody the law and
economics mainstream. For example, Posner's approach, even early on, was distinctive in
that his was purportedly a positivist project, whereas Calabresi and most legal economists
today reject strong-form versions of positivism and instead consider themselves norma-
tivists. Keith N. Hylton, Calabresi and the Intellectual History of Law and Economics, 64 MD. L.
REv. 85, 91-92 (2005). Once again, though, our focus is on dispositionism, where Posner's
perspective did come to dominate.
44. There are certainly other ways to compare where scholars lie on the dispositionism-
situationism spectrum. Another possible approach is to examine their cost schema-that is,
how far and wide each scholar looks in determining how harmful or costly an accident was.
The dispositionist will tend to see costs in relatively narrow terms, paying relatively little
attention to those that are more complex and difficult to measure. The situationist, in
contrast, will consider costs well beyond the most salient and easy to measure. We have not
applied that comparison to Posner and Calabresi here, but we will assert that, on this di-
mension as well, Calabresi appears to be relatively situationist. In his more recent writings,
Calabresi has suggested that common sense draws us only to the most salient of harms-in
particular, the economic and physical ones:
[I]f I suffer pangs, feel sick to my stomach, because I see an accident in which
people have been killed, I cannot recover damages for that suffering. Yet why
should not the "costs" of that accident include my pangs? Why not give people
recovery when they drive past a bloody accident and feel the worse for it? That
my feelings are for others, rather than for myself, does not make my feelings any
less real, or any less a reason why the behavior, which led to the accident and to
my feeling ill, should be discouraged. That is-if we were to do a full societal
cost-benefit analysis-one of the costs of accepting the deity's gifts of motor cars
is surely my feeling ill when I see an accident ....
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On each of those dimensions a scholar can be more or less disposi-
tionist. The following Sections argue that with respect to each of
those four schemas, Posner is more dispositionist than Calabresi.
1. Model Actor.-The first variable of comparison is the model ac-
tor-or person schema-envisioned by scholars in the analysis of tort
settings.45 In analyzing conceptions of the model actor, the key ques-
tions revolve around the degree to which consumers, or potential in-jurers and victims, are understood to be dispositionist and rational.
How seriously, for example, does each scholar take into account the
role of internal and external situational factors on the conduct of
those individuals? More specifically, at what level of situational influ-
ence does the scholar begin to question the "free choice" presump-
tion? And does the model actor reflect social scientific research
devoted to understanding human behavior or does it rely mostly on
common-sense, but untested, assumptions about human behavior?
GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATrITUDES, AND THE LAW: PRIVATE LAW PERSPECTIVES ON
A PUBLIc LAW PROBLEM 70 (1985) [hereinafter IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, AND THE LAW].
For Calabresi, if the purpose is to find all of the costs, one cannot simply rely on common-
sense notions. Casting the net wide is often a confounding process, and elsewhere Cala-bresi emphasizes the incommensurability of ideals, values, and attitudes that make clo-
sure-real closure-impossible for many questions. As Calabresi and Bobbitt write:
Attempts to weigh precisely the social costs and benefits associated with different
responses to a tragic choice result more often in the valuation of only what we can
measure than in the measurement of all that we value. Costs which are difficult to
measure, such as the affront to the value of human life entailed by a decision to
authorize medical experimentation with the terminally ill, will often be left out of
the accounting altogether, though the resulting narrowness of the premises will
poison the conclusion.
GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BoBBITr, TRAGic CHOICES 41 n.15 (1978). Not looking at cer-
tain costs may make our models more satisfying, but it does not move us closer to the truth.
There are still other lines of comparison that do not create much contrast between
Calabresi and Posner. For instance, a major difference between both Calabresi's and Pos-
ner's approaches and the critical realist approach is the extent to which each attempts to
understand what situational forces are influencing law and legal theory. Moreover, mostlegal economists, Calabresi included, examine policies as if they are exogenous from one
another. Each area of law-from antitrust law to corporate law, criminal law, environmen-
tal law, and family law-is treated as an autonomous agent, with its own efficiency-driven
disposition. Most policy analysis is, in that sense, dispositionist. This, too, is a weakness
that critical realism attempts to address. See, e.g., Chen & Hanson, Illusion of Law, supra
note 15 (connecting corporate law to other areas of law).
45. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra note 14, at Part IV (discussing
the model actor).
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a. Posner.-Posner's dispositionist model actor is thor-
oughly examined in other work.46 We will not repeat that analysis
here, but, for purposes of contrast, we will highlight some of its
conclusions.
When Posner considers the human interior, it is with the eyes of a
dispositionist. Posner began the 1972 edition of his Economic Analysis
of Law47 with the assumptions that "man is a rational maximizer of his
ends in life," that "people respond to incentives" (by which he meant,
especially, prototypical incentives such as economic rewards, prices,
and criminal penalties), and that resources therefore tend "to gravi-
tate toward their highest valued uses if exchange is permitted."
48
More generally, Posner assumes stable preferences and willful choices
as the basis of most behavior. Like virtually all economists and legal
economists, he takes for granted that actions reflect choices and that
choices reveal preferences. When resources gravitate toward their
highest-valued use, that is because the exchanges reflect those stable
preferences. An exchange does not occur if the person without the
resource prefers it less than the person possessing it (as measured by
willingness to pay). And, like most economic dispositionists, Posner
presumes that individuals are competently able to process available
information and make their judgments absent any systematic biases.
That strong-form dispositionist actor is roughly whom Posner is imag-
ining in his rational-actor model.
Although it is true that, when pushed (by evidence or by the need
to confirm his argument), Posner will concede that people may be
subject to a small number of choice-making "quirks," he returns to the
fully informed and rational rendition of the dispositionist actor as his
firm default. And even if he sometimes allows for imperfect informa-
tion and occasionally waivers on the rationality assumption, he clings
steadfastly to the dispositionism assumption. In defending his con-
ception of the human animal, Posner rarely looks to social scientific
insights beyond those offered by economists, who themselves presume
dispositionism. The bedrock of Posner's dispositionist view appears to
be his common-sense intuitions, intuitions that he fully trusts. Such
nafie realism49 allows Posner to avoid the sticky (and thoroughly situa-
46. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 14; Hanson & Yosifon, 
The Situa-
tional Character, supra note 14; Benforado & Hanson, Naive Cynicism, 
supra note 15; Han-
son, Reyes & Schlanger, Attributional Positivism, supra note 15.
47. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 1 (1972) [hereinafter ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS, 1st ed.].
48. Id at 1, 4.
49. Social psychologists define "naive realism" as the human tendency 
to believe that
we see the world through unfiltered lenses-in other words, as it really 
is. Our naive real-
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tionist) question of what lies behind his own intuition-based
attributions. 50
This proclivity is also evident in his approach to being a judge,51
where he again places great faith in his own common-sense notions
ism allows us to infer that those who are similarly clear sighted will view things the sameway. Thus, when encountering individuals who offer conflicting perspectives, we often as-sume that they lack information or that their lenses are more or less filtered. See, e.g., LeeRoss & Andrew Ward, Nahe Realism: Implications for Social Conflict and Misunderstanding, inVALUES AND KNOWLEDGE 103 (Edward S. Reed et al. eds., 1996). For a more completereview of the naive realism literature, see Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra
note 14, and Benforado & Hanson, Naive Cynicism, supra note 15.50. Dispositionist naive realism may be part of what has led Posner to "pragmatism"-an approach that purportedly allows him to reach "practical solutions to current problems"without getting "tangled in metaphysical questions." Steve Kurtz, Sex, Economics, and OtherLegal Matters, REASON ONLINE, April 2001, at http://reason.com/0104/int.sk.sex.shtml. AsLarissa MacFarquhar asserts:
It is one of Posner's most persistent and confounding convictions that it is possi-ble to practice a purely "pragmatic" jurisprudence. He argues that since there isno objective way to discover the definitive meaning of an ambiguous law, judges
should ignore highfalutin morality talk and simply make decisions based on whatis sensible and conducive to social welfare-disregarding the obvious fact thatdeciding what is sensible and conducive to social welfare is a controversial busi-ness in which moral principles are inevitably at stake. This problem has beenpointed out to Posner many times, and he has conceded it many times, but he
always slides back again into his old ways.Larissa MacFarquhar, The Bench Burner, THE NEW YORKER, Dec. 10, 2001, at 88. For someexamples of related criticisms of Posner's pragmatism, see Brian E. Butler, Posner's Problemwith Moral Philosophy, 7 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 325, 341-42 (2000) (reviewing RiHARDA. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY (1999)) ("Posner's . ..description of the pragmatic judge's aim .. .is so bland as to be almost universally beyondreproach."); Tibor R. Machan, Posner's Rortyite (Pragmatic)Jurisprudence, 40 AM. J. JuRis. 361,371-75 (1995); Frank S. Ravitch, Can an Old Dog Learn New Tricks? A NonfoundationalistAnalysis of Richard Posner's The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 37 TULSA L. REv.967, 980 (2002) (book review) ("What is Legal Pragmatism according to Posner?... I stilldo not have a clear answer beyond vague calls for reaching the 'best answer,' consideringconsequences, and making things better."); Jeremy Waldron, Ego-Bloated Hovel, 94 Nw. U.L. REv. 597, 600 (2000) (reviewing POSNER, supra) ("Posner's writing.., turns slippery andevasive (by analytical standards) when the time comes to explain what 'pragmatism'
amounts to.").
51. As noted above, we have tried to limit our discussion to Posner's early tort scholar-ship that has been (and is) extremely influential in law and economics, and which is closein topic, if not in style, to Calabresi's The Costs of Accidents. We deviate from that approachhere and include a brief discussion of Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad Co. v. American CyanamidCo., 916 F.2d 1174 (7th Cir. 1 9 90)--one of Posner's later court decisions-because it isone of his opinions that is explicitly based on legal-economic concepts and reasoning (ap-plying some of his own early scholarly insights) and because it has found its way intocasebooks as an example of such reasoning. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES ANDMATERLLS ON TORTS 660-69 (7th ed. 2000). We include it also as an example of preciselythe kind of case where Posner is situationally encouraged to be a dispositionist. Althoughit is beyond the scope of this paper, we suspect that a careful survey of all of Posner's tortlaw opinions would reveal several patterns. For instance, we hypothesize that Posner is, fora number of reasons, more situationist as ajudge than he was earlier in his career as a tort
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and has little tolerance for arguments that do not align with what 
he
believes to be the truth. 2 Although Posner's rational-actor model 
is
rarely made explicit in his judicial decisionmaking, it is generally im-
plicit. Judge Posner's dispositionism is evident, for instance, in 
his
well-known Indiana Harbor decision. When a toxic spill forced nearby
residents to evacuate their homes near a South Chicago switching
yard, Posner was faced with the question of who should be liable 
for
the cleanup costs. From his opinion, it appears that he took the situa-
tion around the accident-the fact that large quantities of chemicals
are transported through such populated areas-as given, natural, and
efficient."a He seemed unable to imagine it being any other way-
that fewer chemicals might be transported or that other routes might
exist or even that different sorts of processes or vehicles might act 
as
theorist. See infra text accompanying notes 131-132 (suggesting that being a 
judge forces
one to move beyond the most salient actors). Moreover, we suspect that Posner 
would be
more or less situationist depending upon his situation in a particular 
case. For instance,
where a district court has granted a defendant's motion for summary 
judgment, Posner
(indeed, most judges) would, other things equal, tend to be more situationally 
sensitive
given their charge of determining the existence of any genuine 
issues of material fact. Put
differently, such cases require judges to search for facts that might preclude summary 
judg-
ment, an inquiry that itself is likely to promote situationism. 
But other things are not
always equal. In cases where the trial court ruled in favor of a dramatic 
expansion of tort
liability, particularly when based on situational reasoning, Posner's 
dispositionism is likely
to intensify. We will outline some of the reasons for that 
prediction below, but, very
roughly, a decision that deviates substantially from the status quo 
and that is premised on
situationist reasoning will tend to create a sense of system threat, 
which, in turn, will tend
to increase a judge's urge to dispositionalize. Indiana Harbor was, we believe, such 
a case.
Indeed, early in his opinion, Posner seemed to tip his hand by 
underscoring the fact that,
although the lower court ruled in favor of holding the defendant 
"strictly liable" for harms
caused by the spill of a hazardous liquid (acrylonitrile), "[n]o [other] cases recognize 
so
sweeping a liability." Ind. Harbor, 916 F.2d at 1178.
52. As MacFarquhar summarizes: "In hearing a case ... [Posner] doesn't 
first inquire
into the constricting dictates of precedent; instead, he comes up 
with what strikes him as a
sensible solution, then looks to see whether precedent excludes 
it." MacFarquhar supra
note 50, at 78. Posner admits to finding common-sense solutions 
very appealing:
I'm not fully socialized into the legal profession... I'm like an imperfectly 
house-
broken pet. I still have difficulty understanding-and this is something 
that most
people get over in their first two weeks of law school-lawyers 
spouting things
that they don't believe. If someone is obviously guilty, why do 
you have to have all
this rigmarole?
Id.
53. Ind. Harbor, 916 F.2d at 1180-81. Posner's situational insensitivity 
in Indiana Harbor
and, more generally, in much of his case analyses-both as scholar 
and judge-is devel-
oped in much greater detail in work now in progress. Hanson, Reyes 
& Schlanger, Attribu-
tional Positivism, supra note 15. Aspects of the decision relating 
to distributional concerns
are examined in Chen & Hanson, Distribution Versus Efficiency, 
supra note 41.
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substitutes for rail cars.54 Similarly, he seemed not to notice that ex-isting arrangements may be a reflection of the existing liability rule, asmuch as if they are a reason for preferring that rule. What was salientto Posner were the actors close to the spill and the actors connected tothe most salient cause of the spill-a broken outlet lid on a tank car.He knew that they were responsible, even though he did not knowexactly how. And, thus, Posner asserted that the costs should liewhere they fell because the accident was caused by someone's
carelessness,
whether that of the North American Car Corporation in fail-ing to maintain or inspect the car properly, or that of Cyana-
mid in failing to maintain or inspect it, or that of theMissouri Pacific when it had custody of the car, or that of theswitching line itself in failing to notice the ruptured lid, orsome combination of these possible failures of care. Acci-dents that are due to a lack of care can be prevented by tak-ing care; and when a lack of care can ... be shown in court,
such accidents are adequately deterred by the threat of liabil-
ity for negligence."
Posner sees the dispositions of individuals as variable and curablebut the situation as static and constant.5 6 In a similar vein, later in the
54. Ind. Harbor, 916 F.2d at 1180 (asserting that " [w]ith most hazardous chemicals... itis unlikely-and certainly not demonstrated by the plaintiff-that they can be reroutedaround all the metropolitan areas in the country, except at prohibitive cost").55. Id. at 1179. One striking element of Posner's opinion is that it seems to contradicthis own theory about how judges should, or can, reach such holdings. As Stephen Gilleshas argued:
On the record before the court, Posner's conclusion seems perfectly sound. Butsurely his ability to arrive at that conclusion undercuts the premise on which heundertook the inquiry in the first place. To conclude that spills of [the hazardouschemicals] probably could not "have been prevented at reasonable cost by achange in the activity of transporting the chemical" is, in substance, to determinethat, as a rule, it is not negligent to transport acrylonitrile by rail rather than byother means or by rail through metropolitan areas rather than rerouting to avoidthem. That is a rule-based determination of the very same activity-level negli-gence claims that Posner assumed the negligence standard could not handle.Stephen G. Gilles, Rule-Based Negligence and the Regulation of Activity Levels, 21J. LEGAL STUD.319, 337 (1992); see also Mark Geistfeld, Should Enterprise Liability Replace the Rule of StrictLiability for Abnormally Dangerous Activities ?, 45 UCLA L. REV. 611, 656 n.137 (1998) (provid-ing additional criticisms of Posner's reasoning).56. But what if such carelessness cannot be shown? Or what if the lack of care was notof the sort that courts would deem negligent, even under the Learned Hand formula? It isnot enough to show that more care might have been taken; even according to his view ofnegligence, one must show that there is costjustified care that would have prevented theaccident. And what if transporters and/or carriers were made strictly liable for the costs ofsuch spills? Is it so clear that they would not have altered their conduct in numerous waysthat Posner has either failed to consider or considered and dismissed? See generally Han-
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case, when confronting the possibility that his ruling might leave
nearby residents absorbing the costs of toxic spills, Posner again sees
disposition:
Brutal though it may seem to say it, the inappropriate use to
which land is being put in the Blue Island yard and neigh-
borhood may be, not the transportation of hazardous chemi-
cals, but residential living. The analogy is to building your
home between the runways at O'Hare.
The brutality that Posner senses (or suspects that his readers will
sense) is, we believe, a consequence of Posner's blindness to the situa-
tion or an assumption that the situation is immutable or otherwise not
up for debate. From a dispositionist perspective, the analogy to
"building your home between" airport runways seems rather appropri-
ate. The runway resident has no right to complain about rattling win-
dows, jet fumes, and that constant, deafening rumble, because he
obviously got a reduced price on the real estate given its location. You
asked for it; you got it. In the same way, if individuals are living near
railroad tracks where major spills may occur, then they must be there
out of choice. Presumably they contemplated the risks of toxic spills
and got an appropriate discount, or perhaps they just like the smell.
In any event, their actions reveal their preference-driven choices.
The "brutality" of this argument is its obliviousness to the situa-
tional influences that may have influenced the "choices" of nearby re-
sidents-that, for instance, many of the harmed individuals did not
have the resources to live elsewhere in the city or that they may have
underestimated the risk (or the likelihood that a judge hearing of
such a spill would leave them to bear the costs)." As we will see,
son, Reyes & Schlanger, Attributional Positivism, supra note 15 (exploring those 
questions
in detail).
57. Ind. Harbor, 916 F.2d at 1181. Posner makes this observation 
as part of a compari-
son between two "activity-level" (here, relocation) considerations. See id. ("It 
is no more
realistic to propose to reroute the shipment of all hazardous 
materials around Chicago
than it is to propose the relocation of homes adjacent to the Blue Island switching yard 
to
more distant suburbs. It may be less realistic.").
58. Part of the effectiveness of the analogy is in the fact that, in the 
airport example,
the annoyances are extremely salient and there are no other homes 
in the vicinity-it is
very hard to imagine that anyone would build a home between airport 
runways and not
know exactly what she was getting into. In such a case, the dispositionist-actor 
reasoning
seems strong. With that attributional schema activated, it is easy 
to conclude, as Posner
suggests, that the dangers in the toxic spill scenario are just as salient. Yet the two 
scena-
rios are quite different, as are the risks (and risk perceptions) of uncompensated 
toxic
spills in a long-existing, densely populated residential area, on one 
hand, and of jets land-
ing at a major airport on the other.
Judge Posner has emphasized to us that that portion of his opinion 
is really "just mak-
ing the Coasean point . . . that one can't just assume that the best way to prevent an
20051
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where Posner is likely to glance over such considerations and to em-phasize disposition, Calabresi is far more apt to see them as con-
straints that cannot be ignored. 59
b. Calabresi.-Where dispositionists are content to assume
the validity of common-sense notions of human behavior, situationists
are often skeptical.60 Moreover, situationists seek to understand what
moves us even if the resulting information is not pleasing (that is, not
self-, group-, and system-affirming).
Calabresi's understanding of the human animal in The Costs ofAccidents is, on that dimension, significantly more situationist thanPosner's. Indeed, on a number of occasions he makes a central situa-tionist claim: despite our notions to the contrary, we humans do not
understand ourselves well.61 We tend to attribute causation, responsi-bility, and even blame to individuals, and to disregard the often morepowerful role played by processes, systems, and situations.62 What
many believe to demonstrate free choice is often highly constrainedbehavior-whether the unappreciated constraints come from within
us (interior situation), from our environment (exterior situation), or,
more likely, from some combination of the two.
(1) Interior Situationism.-Calabresi has long doubted that
real humans are rational actors. Too often, he believes, people do not
accident or nuisance is to place liability on the injurer, because the victim may be (inCalabresi's terminology) the 'cheapest cost avoider.'" E-mail from Richard Posner, supra
note 37.
We do not mean to challenge the analytics of his "Coasean point." Coase teaches that,were people rational actors and were transactions costs zero, then legal allocations of enti-dements would be irrelevant. If transactions costs are high in that Coasean world, thenefficiency-minded lawmakers would need to make a Calabresian calculation to determinewho among the various actors is the "cheapest cost avoider." Our point is directed, not atPosner's Coasean analytics, but at the element of his narrative that would lead readers, byhis own account, to see his argument as "brutal." The brutal part, as we argued in the text,is the analogy that Posner so easily offers between living in a neighborhood near the BlueIsland yard and "building your home between the runways at O'Hare." It takes some hard-
core dispositionism to see that "analogy" as apt.
59. As explored in other work, there are some exceptions to Posner's hard-core dis-positionism. At times, even in his work on accident law, he allows for the possibility thatindividuals may be imperfect processors of certain types of risk information, such as risks ofconsumer products. See, e.g., Croley & Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution, supra note 16, at737; Benforado & Hanson, Naive Cynicism, supra note 15.
60. Cf Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 14, at 191-92.
61. See id
62. See id. at 149-79; Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra note 14, passim.
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make reliable judgments, no matter how well informed they might
be.63 As he points out:
[E]ven if individuals had adequate data for evaluating ...
[certain] risk[s], they would be psychologically unable to do
so. The contention is that people cannot estimate rationally
their chances of suffering death or catastrophic injury. Such
things always happen to "the other guy," and no amount of
statistical information can convince an individual that they
could happen to him.64
Similarly, Calabresi argues that individuals may face cognitive con-
straints when deciding between temporal tradeoffs. As he puts it, peo-
ple often "do not know best for themselves . . . where the choice 
is




Calabresi goes further than just doubting individuals' abilities to
calculate. He questions, too, whether individuals always begin with 
a
set of preferences that they hope to satisfy and whether their actions
constitute preference-determined choices. In other words, he chal-
lenges not just the "rational" part, but also the dispositionist (actor or
chooser) part, of standard economic models.
As evidence of the malleability of our inner wants or of the possi-
bility that our behavior may not reveal those wants, for instance, Cala-
bresi points to the fact that "people do not save up for doctors' bills,
do not provide for their retirement, do not insure adequately, and yet
are basically happy if they are forced to do so.
"66 Removing choice
from people may, Calabresi suggests, leave them better off-a possibil-
ity that flies in the face of hard-core dispositionism.
(2) Exterior Situationism.-At points, Calabresi also takes
seriously non-obvious influences in an actor's environment. In that
way, his work is consonant with the bulk of social psychological
evidence.
In some circumstances, it is hard to miss the impact of situation
on people's conduct. People do not trust, and the law does not en-
force, "choices" made under the threat of direct physical violence. A
63. See THE COSTS OF AccIDENTS, supra note 4, at 55-56.
64. Id. at 56.
65. Id. at 57. It has taken several decades for economists to begin 
taking seriously the
possibility that individuals are so inept. For a summary of the more 
recent evidence on
intertemporal biases and optimism bias, see Hanson & Yosifon, 
The Situational Character,
supra note 14. But in recent years, the phenomena Calabresi 
highlighted have been
named and empirically verified, and now provide the foundation 
of a new version of eco-
nomics known as, among other things, economic behavioralism. See 
id.
66. THE CosTs OF AccDENTS, supra note 4, at 57.
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signature does not reveal consent when the signer has a gun to hishead. But when situation is camouflaged even slightly, we tend to lose
sight of it and presume that "choices" are made freely.
Probably the most striking and famous demonstration of thepower of camouflaged situation was Stanley Milgram's series of experi-
ments, in which ordinary people were induced to (they believed) ad-minister massive shocks to human subjects.67 To Milgram's surprise-
the power of situation was, at first, invisible even to him-most ordi-
nary individuals did not require much coaxing to engage in such hei-
nous conduct.68 As Milgram was to demonstrate through hundreds ofrelated experiments, it was the unseen situation behind the conduct,far more than the dispositions of the individuals involved, that ex-plained. the disturbing behavior.69 Still, it is extremely difficult forhumans (particularly Westerners and most especially economists) to
attribute the subjects' behavior in Milgram's studies to anything other
than free choice and wicked dispositions.
Calabresi is not like most economists. He recognizes that
"choice" is not always what it seems and that hard-to-see situationalfactors are often driving forces. Indeed, in Ideals, Beliefs, Attitudes, andthe Law, Calabresi goes out of his way to warn readers about the illu-
sion of free choice, by comparing two hypothetical settings.70 In thefirst, the power of situation is as salient as a gun to the head: a womanis given a choice by Nazi doctors to either take part in dreadful experi-
ments over a six-month period or spend the time in a concentration
camp.71 There, the constraint on free choice is clear.
In the second setting, the situational influence is less evident, andit is much easier to perceive volition: terminally ill cancer patients aregiven the choice to take part in a vaccination experiment that wouldincrease their risk of death but potentially save the lives of some ba-bies stricken with herpes meningitis. Yet, as Calabresi highlights, in
the second scenario a
question remains-was that which was treated by all con-
cerned (including the hospital experiment committee which
67. For a more comprehensive description of Milgram's experiments and many subse-quent experiments that also demonstrate the unseen power of situation, see Hanson &Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 14, and Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supranote 14. For those wanting to know more about Milgram's situation, we recommend therecent biography, THOMAS BLASs, THE MAN WHO SHOCKED THE WORLD: THE LIFE AND LEG-
ACY OF STANLEY MILGRAM (2004).
68. Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 14, at 152.
69. Id. at 152-54.
70. CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATrITUDES, AND THE LAw, supra note 44, at 4-5.
71. Id.
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approved the experiment) as a free choice in fact a free
choice, or was it a decision-worth making perhaps, but
made by the researcher and the committee-in which indi-
vidual choices played little role, except to ratify the fact that
the researcher had done "the best he could" and the experi-
ment was worthy?
72
With such examples, Calabresi underscores that human conduct is not
always a reflection of free actions evincing a deep, stable set of prefer-
ences. Our behavior might be highly constrained, if not fully deter-
mined, by factors as seemingly innocuous as a doctor's white lab coat.
In his judicial opinions, Calabresi has similarly been willing to hold
parties liable owing to their situational influence.73
We should emphasize that Calabresi is still presumptively a dis-
positionist. As he states, "[w]e do not need to deny that there are
many areas where people do know best for themselves in order to
affirm that there are some where they do not."74 Our focus in this
piece is to show Calabresi's relative situationism within the law and
economics movement, and, in particular, to suggest that Calabresi is
significantly more sensitive to the situation than Posner.
75
2. Law's Goal Schema.-Scholars' positions along the disposition-
ism-situationism spectrum can also be compared by scrutinizing what
end or ends they believe the law should serve-that is, by looking at
72. Id. at 4 (footnotes omitted).
73. See, e.g., Taber v. Maine, 67 F.3d 1029, 1036 (2d Cir. 1995) (employing an expansive
reading of the employer-benefit requirement in holding the military liable for a drunken
sailor's off-base drunk driving accident and reasoning that, "in the end, 'employer-benefit'
is significant only because it is one way of showing that the harm that drinking causes can
properly be considered a cost of the employer's enterprise").
74. THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 4, at 57; see also id. at 55-56 ("This approach
does not question the general proposition that people know what is best for themselves by
and large but is based instead on the view that in the area of accidents they often do not.").
In these examples, Calabresi is referring, in part, to the presence or absence of knowl-
edge-not the presence or absence of dispositionist choice. Still, we emphasize this lan-
guage because we believe it reveals Calabresi's presumption that individuals do, and should
generally, choose for themselves (based on their knowledge).
75. Calabresi might have been more situationist had he been writing about accident
law at a time when the research on situationism was as robust as it has since become.
Although Calabresi's situationist insights are in sync with psychological evidence of the
time, many of his psychological claims are offered with little support. In pointing out the
irrationality of human behavior in insuring against risk, for instance, Calabresi writes,
"[s]ome adduce evidence of this psychological truth from the fact that people are much
more likely to carry liability insurance (for injuries 'the other guy' may receive) than per-
sonal accident insurance (for injuries they may receive)." Id. at 56 (citing ALFRED F. CON-
ARD ET AL., AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COSTS AND PAYMENTS: STUDIES IN THE ECONOMICS OF
INJURY REPARATION 128 (1964)). See infra Part II.B.4 for more on how Calabresi became
familiar with the insights of social psychology.
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the goal schema (positive or normative) imagined for the laws being
analyzed.76
As will become clear, the goal envisioned for the law depends
significantly upon the model actor envisaged.77 Where, as in the most
dispositionist accounts, the human animal moves single-mindedly in
pursuit of her (usually narrow) preferences, the goal of law is to help
humans satisfy those preferences; Where, as in the situationist ac-
count, the human animal is complex and moved by many forces, the
ends of law will tend to be similarly complex. Any law devoted to in-
creasing human welfare or altering human conduct will need to take
those various, complex ends and factors into account.
a. Posner.-Again, since Posner's narrow focus in analyzing
accident law has been thoroughly covered elsewhere,7" we will only
offer a brief overview of his position. In Posner's analysis of accident
costs, the law's goal is quite simple -- the maximization of wealth. Pos-
ner's thesis (with Bill Landes) is "that the common law of torts is best
explained as if the judges who created the law through decisions oper-
ating as precedents in later cases were trying to promote efficient re-
source allocation."79  Individuals are rational dispositionists
attempting to maximize their wealth, and the law is, in service to those
individuals, designed (consciously or not) to maximize the social
wealth that individuals compete for.8 ' A key means of advancing that
end is, according to Posner, for the law to encourage contracting and
market transactions, which permit resources to travel toward their
highest valued use, and to discourage anything that interferes with
76. In other work, one of us, with Ron Chen, identifies three levels of policy schemas-
the meta-level schema, defining the general purpose to be served by all policy; the macro-
level schema, defining the purpose to be served by a particular subject in law (from anti-
trust to family law); and the micro-level schema, defining the purpose to be served by a
specific area of law (such as, say, defamation law within tort law). See Chen & Hanson,Categorically Biased, supra note 15, at 1249. Roughly, this Section compares Posner's and
Calabresi's macro-level schemas for tort law-though the distinctions may be less signifi-
cant for Posner, whose schemas are fairly uniform across different levels of analysis.
77. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra note 14.
78. See authorities cited supra note 59.
79. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 16, at 1.
80. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, IJ. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32-36 (1972)(arguing that judges pursued efficiency goals even before economic logic of this posture
was fully understood); Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm
in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 487, 487-88 (1980) (arguing how wealth
maximization is an "ethically attractive norm in common law adjudication"); Richard A.Posner, Wealth Maximization and Judicial Decision-Making, 4 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 131, 133(1984) (arguing that wealth maximization is the only "value that courts can do much to
promote").
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those mechanisms:8 "By a process of voluntary exchange, resources
are shifted to those uses in which the value to consumers, as measured
by their willingness to pay, is highest. When resources are being used
where their value is highest .... we say that they are being employed
efficiently."8 2 Posner's strongly presumptive deference to contracts
and markets also evinces his dispositionism.83
Relatedly, Posner has, with Bill Landes, made the case that the
law should defer to customary practices in determining what injury-
causing conduct is or is not negligent (that is, inefficient or effi-
cient):84 "If transaction costs are low, an optimal allocation of re-
sources to safety as to other activities will be achieved by negotiation
regardless of the liability rule in force. In these circumstances
whatever is customary is, at least prima facie, optimal."85 That logic,
too, turns on dispositionist presumptions: custom reflects choices,
choices reflect preferences, and, thus, what is customary is good.
86
In the name of narrowing their model even further, Landes and
Posner base their analysis on "an extremely simple economic model of
tort law-a model in which, for example, risk aversion and therefore
insurance play no role."87 Thus, even when focusing on efficiency,
Posner eliminates considerations that most scholars, Calabresi first
among them, not only include, but also consider extremely
important.88
Overall, Posner is quite resolute in disregarding or dismissing
possible non-efficiency ends of law,89 another manifestation of his dis-
positionist view of the law'sgoals. With respect to "distributional con-
cerns," for example, Posner writes, in a review of Calabresi's The Costs
of Accidents, that although the goal of bringing about an efficient level
81. RicHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYsIs OF LAw 9-16 (6th ed. 2003).
82. Id. at 9-10.
83. Because individuals are perceived as acting to pursue preferences that only they
can directly access, contracts and markets are viewed as the only reliable means of ensuring
allocative efficiency. See generally Hanson & Wright, In the Driver's Seat, supra note 15.
84. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 16, at 131-39.
85. Id. at 132.
86. See Hanson, Reyes & Schlanger, Attributional Positivism, supra note 15 (examining
Landes and Posner's analysis of custom in greater detail).
87. L.ANDES & POSNER, supra note 16, at 22. That is not to say that Posner and his co-
authors do not discuss and offer justifications for that exclusion. They do. See id. passim.
88. See Hanson, Reyes & Schlanger, Attributional Positivism, supra note 15 (providing a
more expansive critique of Landes and Posner's decision to exclude insurance
considerations).
89. Again, here, we are only highlighting a conclusion that is defended in far greater
detail in other work. See Chen & Hanson, Distribution Versus Efficiency, supra note 41




of accident costs may be "subject to the constraint that the methods
chosen to do so be consistent with justice[,]' [i]n practice this con-
straint turns out to be rather unimportant" because notions of justice
likely correspond with efficiency considerations. 90
Posner made his distaste for distributional concerns evident, too,
in his Indiana Harbor decision. There he underscored his view that the
law is concerned more with the "allocative rather than the distributive,"
by which he meant "that the emphasis is on picking a liability regime(negligence or strict liability) that will control the particular class of
accidents in question most effectively, rather than on finding the
deepest pocket and placing liability there."91 According to Posner,
the plaintiff's attorney strayed from that schema at oral argument
where she pointed "out that [the defendant] is a huge firm and the[plaintiff is a] fifty-mile-long switching line that almost went broke in
the winter of 1979, when the accident occurred."92 Posner's response
was characteristically terse: "Well, so what? A corporation is not a liv-
ing person but a set of contracts the terms of which determine who
will bear the brunt of liability."9 3 Non-efficiency concerns simply do
not have a place in Posner's playbook.94
90. Richard A. Posner, Book Review, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 636, 638 (1970) [hereinafter
Book Review]; see also LANDES & POSNER, supra note 16, at 13-14 (making a similar argu-
ment); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OFJUSTICE (1983) (same); Richard A. Posner,
Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Thebiy, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103, 127 (1979) (noting that
"the purely formal characteristics of a just legal system . . . can also be derived from the
wealth-maximization principle"); Richard A. Posner, The Economic Approach to Law, 53 TEX.
L. REv. 757, 777-78 (1975) (same).
91. Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174, 1181-82 (7th Cir.
1990).
92. Id. at 1182.
93. Id.
94. Although our focus is on the narrowness of Posner's dispositionist gaze, there are
other problems with Posner's rebuke. One problem, for instance, is that the party's size
and wealth may have deterrence-that is allocative-implications. For instance, an insol-
vent defendant may not respond to any general deterrence message that tort law attempts
to send.
Also, in response to an earlier draft of this Article, Posner indicated that we may have
misunderstood his point about "deep pockets," which, he explains, is that "[i]ncreasedliability will be experienced by the firm as increased marginal costs, which will lead to a
price increase and therefore to higher prices for consumers, and probably also lower em-ployment because the price increase will reduce the demand for ... the firm's products.
The result is that the distributional effect of increased liability is uncertain." E-mail from
Richard Posner, supra note 37. Perhaps we have misunderstood his original point; in any
event, we will confess to now being confused. First, we are not clear on how that "distribu-
tional effect" would connect to the "deep pockets" issue that we thought he was addressing
in his opinion. Second, if the point is that one cannot easily "trac[e] the incidence of a
cost" resulting from an allocation of liability, Ind. Harbor, 916 F.2d at 1182, then that too
would seem as lethal to an efficiency analysis as it is to a distributional analysis. Very sim-ply, knowing the deterrence effects of a rule depends upon knowing who bears the costs.
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b. Calabresi.-In The Costs of Accidents, Calabresi focuses
mostly on "reduc[ing] the costs of accidents. 9 5 While on the surface
this seems to align with Posner's goal schema-cost minimization and
wealth maximization being two sides of the same coin-Calabresi has
a notably different understanding of the details.
Moreover, that "distributional effect" does not seem to be a distributional effect, as con-
ventionally understood among legal economists. Indeed, it seems more accurately de-
scribed as an allocative efficiency effect-specifically, the prototypical activity-level effect.
See generally Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, What Liability Crisis? An Alternative Explana-
tion for Recent Events in Products Liability, 8 YALEJ. ON REG. 1, 67-75 (1991) (describing and
examining the care-level and activity-level effects of different products liability rules and
challenging the conventional wisdom that courts are any better able to "know" the care-
level effects of a liability rule than they are the activity-level effects). As one of us has noted
in work now in progress, it is striking that Posner otherwise omits conventional activity-level
issues when arguing in Indiana Harbor that there was no activity-level justification for strict
liability. See Hanson, Reyes & Schlanger, Attributional Positivism, supra note 15; see also id.
(arguing that activity-level considerations tend to receive less attention by courts than care-
level considerations, not because they are, in fact, more costly for courts to estimate, but
because they tend to be, with exceptions, attributionally less salient).
We had thought that Posner, in his Indiana Harbor opinion, was echoing the fairly
standard economistic argument that courts applying legal rules should focus on alloca-
tional concerns and ignore distributional concerns, in part, because they lacked the exper-
tise and mandate to make the necessary value judgments. Calabresi makes the critique this
way:
Unfortunately, the use made of economic analysis of law by many of its practition-
ers-for example, Judge Richard Posner-lends itself precisely to the criticisms
that have been thrown at it. These practitioners seem almost to say that because
"we" cannot say anything "scientific or scholarly" about starting points or distribu-
tional values, we must ignore them and analyze law only on the basis of economic
efficiency defined narrowly to mean wealth maximization. Elsewhere I have tried
to demonstrate that the critics of economic analysis of law are correct in that,
without a basis in these other values, wealth maximization is a meaningless con-
cept. My claim is that Posner and his followers must be making surreptitious
assumptions about starting points and about desirable distributions of wealth in
order to define that "wealth" which they claim law does (or should) maximize.
Guido Calabresi, First Party, Third Party, and Product Liability Systems: Can Economic Analysis of
Law Tell Us Anything About Them?, 69 IowA L. REv. 833, 833-34 (1984) (footnotes omitted).
On a slightly different point, Posner's description of a corporation as a nexus of con-
tracts is no more perfect a metaphor for a corporation than is the "person" metaphor that
may or may not have been imagined by the plaintiff. And the fact that tort claimants
typically do not have a contractual relationship with defendants leads one to wonder about
the wisdom of deferring to that metaphor in this context. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier
Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1920
(1991) (reasoning that contract law should not guide liability determinations with respect
to tort creditors of corporations since unlike contract creditors they cannot evaluate the
creditworthiness of the corporation before an injury occurs); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Essen-
tial Structure ofJudgment Proofing, 51 STAN. L. REv. 147 (1998) (discussing the implications of
basing tort liability on the contractual relationships among corporate entities).
95. THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 4, at 24; see id. at 26 ("Apart from the require-
ments of justice, I take it as axiomatic that the principal function of accident law is to
reduce the sum of the costs of accidents and the costs of avoiding accidents.").
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Instead of excluding various efficiency considerations because of
their complexity, Calabresi makes his analysis more complex in order
to include various efficiency considerations. Indeed, in dividing cost
minimization into several subgoals, he underscores that, for each one,
the analysis is more complicated than generally presumed. With re-
spect to the primary deterrence subgoal, for instance, Calabresi em-
phasizes that how one frames the "cheapest cost avoidance" question
can have important implications for overall cost reduction:
Because the interaction among activities is complex, acci-
dent cost allocations made only on the basis of the cheapest
cost avoidance in each accident case or only on the basis of
cheapest cost avoidance in each type of accident case may not
in sum be optimal in terms of total reduction of such acci-
dent costs.96
Looking at each accident scenario in isolation may be simpler, but it
will not get us to the desired outcome.
Part of Calabresi's project is, thus, to untangle the intricate rela-
tionships between the many questions we ask in accident law. By
maintaining a broad focus, Calabresi identifies the fact that our goals
are often interconnected and that choosing between them involves
tradeoffs:
In concentrating on any one goal, we may lose sight of the
fact that no system of accident law should be designed with
only one goal in mind. The significance of some goals may
depend on the existence of others. If primary accident cost
avoidance were not a goal, for example, the compensation
aim could very easily be discussed in terms of its ideal solu-
tion-a system of general social insurance-and this may be
precisely what is at the root of some of the approaches I have
categorized as social insurance and welfare legislation plans.
But given the goal of primary accident cost avoidance, gen-
eral social insurance may not always be the best solution.
Conversely, primary accident cost avoidance may not, stand-
ing alone, suggest any particular system.97
It is a world of webs and pushing on one strand may pull on an-
other. As Calabresi identifies, for example, there is a "basic conflict
between the spreading we want and the allocation of accident costs
according to accident-proneness (primary cost deterrence) we seem
to need. 918 Most commentators, Calabresi claims, would miss that
96. Id. at 156.
97. Id. at 37.
98. Id. at 50.
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conflict and blindly "proceed on the assumption that wide loss spread-
ing is the goal, while at the same time bemoaning the fact that there is
not greater differentiation into risk categories."99 Calabresi sees the
fine silk threads glinting in the sun and moves in for closer
observation.1 00
Calabresi argues that it is no excuse to ignore a concept like jus-
tice just because it seems "negative and elusive" or is difficult to fit into
a model.10 1 Instead of celebrating closure or more simplistic analyses,
Calabresi delights in the nearly endless options available to policymak-
ers and the choices required of them in balancing the many concerns.
As he puts it,
in considering the bases of accident law, there are virtually
no limits on how we can allocate or divide the costs of acci-
dents. What we choose, whether intentionally or by default,
will reflect the economic and moral goals of our society. Ac-
cordingly, one aim of this book will be to suggest which goals
and subgoals are implied in different possible systems of acci-
dent law and what importance different possible allocations
must in fact give to each of the different goals and
subgoals. 10 2
Calabresi does not stop at the "goals" and "subgoals" of accident
law. Even "outside goals" can be significant in shaping the law.
10 3 For
instance, Calabresi points out how powerful desires for procedural
and substantive consistency both in respect to other fields of law and
within accident law may act as a straitjacket on what policy approaches
will be considered fair by the public. 104 Elsewhere he explains how a
regime that "exacerbates unequal distribution of income or favors mo-
nopolies will violate our moral framework" 0 5 and in appearing unjust
99. Id.
100. And ultimately, Calabresi suggests, we must consider not just this particular web but
all the other webs that might be built in other patterns, in other crooks of trees, in other
forests:
[W]e must always keep in mind the cost of establishing and effectuating the ap-
proach, as well as the benefits the approach is expected to bring about. These
costs and benefits, moreover, must be compared with the costs and benefits of
alternative approaches. We must, in short, always ask whether the game is worth
the candle, not only in terms of the cost of the candle but also in terms of other
games we might be playing.
Id. at 23.
101. Id. at 25; see id. at 24 ("What, then, are the principal goals of any system of accident
law? First, it must be just or fair; second, it must reduce the costs of accidents.").
102. Id. at 23.
103. See id. at 31-33 (discussing goals outside of accident law).
104. Id. at 293-94.
105. Id. at 32.
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will be less readily accepted by the public. 10 6 More recently, he has
also stressed the value of closure-policy decisions coupled with legiti-
mating reasons-in policymaking.1 °7
106. Id. As Calabresi points out:
Whether this is a good result in any given case will depend not only on whether
there are outside means for redressing the undesirable outside effects of the pro-
posed system of accident law, but also on whether the undesirable effects will in
fact be redressed if the system of accident law is adopted.
Id. at 32-33. Elsewhere, Calabresi writes of the potentially distorting effects of our morality
schemas:
Moral attitudes are.., complex. They involve, at the very least, whole categories
of acts that have come to be considered "good" and whole categories that have
come to be considered "evil." No system of accident law can operate unless it
takes into account which acts are deemed good, which deemed evil, and which
deemed neutral. Any system of accident law that encourages evil acts will seem
unjust to critic and community even if economically it is very efficient indeed.
Id. at 294. Again, echoing the insights of social psychologists on the powerful, and often
harmful, effects of stereotyping, he continues:
We have, over time, stigmatized certain acts because of the accident costs we think
they cause; we have stigmatized other acts for other reasons. Accident reduction
plans involving acceptance of acts in the latter category will be considered just or
fair by the community much less readily than plans involving the former category
regardless of whether a critic could argue as to each category that the reasons why
the acts were originally deemed wrongful no longer apply.
Even within the former category I have suggested that we must not anticipate
that an expected reduction in accident costs will change the public's attitude
quickly or even in some cases, ultimately. Moral attitudes develop and decay
slowly. They become encrusted with significance that is often quite foreign to the
situation that engendered them. The longer the history of a moral attitude to-
ward an act, the more likely it is that the attitude will have become separated from
its cause and the more difficult it will be to change the attitude even if the cause is
no longer valid. All this is just a way of saying that, almost by definition, "moral"
status has a strength of its own apart from the original source of the status.
What I have said of individual acts is also true of legal systems. Over time,
they too become encrusted with moral imperatives.
Id. at 296.
Indeed, because Calabresi is attuned to the way humans actually think, he takes a
different, less sanguine view of the law than Posner does. In Calabresi's situationist view:
"We must always remember that the community's sense ofjustice is not, and never can be,
simply a rational reaction, and that it must be reckoned with whether or not it is sensible."
Id. at 294. Reason and efficiency are not pulling the strings: "People may require a one-to-
one world of payment and compensation even if logic and economics make it unnecessary
and even, in some sense, unjust." Id at 304.
107. As Calabresi & Bobbitt write:
Patternless tragic decisions, moreover, exacerbate one of the process costs to
human emotions .... Deep anxiety and frustration are a necessary part of a
process which makes a crucial decision against someone, but which fails to ex-
plain why. One needn't read Kafka to get a sense of the costs of such a process;
we have all experienced analogous frustrations with results which, because unex-
plained, seem arbitrary.
CI.AABREsi & BOBBITr, supra note 44, at 61.
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With so many goals on the table, the policymaker's decision is
significantly more challenging, not only substantively, but also proce-
durally. With Calabresi, market outcomes do not enjoy the privilege
given to them by Posner and many other legal economists, because
they provide just one of numerous legitimate benchmarks. In fact,
market-fostering or -mimicking policies may not be good policy:
[A] lthough the market can help us to decide how far we wish
to go to avoid accidents, it cannot solve the whole problem
for us. And when we overrule the market and ban an acci-
dent-causing activity that can pay its way or subsidize an activ-
ity that cannot, we are not violating absolute laws. We are
making the same type of choice between accidents and acci-
dent-causing activities that the market makes, but we are
choosing, for perfectly valid reasons, to make it in a different
way. We are preferring a collective approach or method
(e.g. because it enables consideration of nonmoney costs
which the market cannot deal with, or because in the partic-
ular instance it is cheaper) to a market approach, even
though the market might allow for individual differences in
tastes and desires that the collective decision might tend to
ignore.1 0 8
Thus, for Calabresi the danger lies not in the lack of surety (and clear
direction) involved in removing "sacred cow status" from market con-
siderations, but in continuing to treat tools of human betterment as
ends in themselves.
In those and other ways, t° ' Calabresi is a relative situationist in
his analysis of the goals of accident law. Where the choice is between
contending with difficult nuance and sacrificing realism, he does not
hesitate.
3. Attributional Schema.-The third way to compare scholars' at-
tributional tendencies is to examine their attributional schema. More
specifically, this Section will examine the extent to which each scholar
108. THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 4, at 20.
109. In his more recent work, Calabresi has tied his situation-dependent actor more
closely to conceptions of law. To dispositionists, recall, preferences are given, independent
of situation, and law is intended to allow for the expression of those preferences through
markets or, when absolutely necessary, market-mimicking alternatives. Calabresi's view, de-
spite his training in economics, allows for the possibility that preferences may sometimes
be context-dependent and variable. Consequently, he does not make the comforting as-
sumption that lawmakers should treat preferences as given. As Calabresi points out,
"[l]aw, unlike economics, is not concerned only, or even primarily, with reduction of costs,
'given tastes.' It is fundamentally concerned with shaping tastes." CALABRESI, IDEALS, BE-
LIEFS, ATITUDES, AND THE LAw, supra note 44, at 84.
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considers the role of situation in the creation of accident costs.
Where the scholar tends to focus mostly or solely on the plaintiff and
defendant, as the existing laws define them, in his or her analysis, he
or she can be said to be relatively dispositionist. Where, in contrast,
the scholar takes seriously the possibility of less obvious causes and
larger, more systemic dynamics in creating accident costs, that scholar
would be described as relatively situationist.
a. Posner.-In numerous ways, Posner's analysis suffers sig-
nificantly from the fundamental attribution error. First, he seems to
be unaware that such a bias exists and overlooks the very distinct possi-
bility that it has played a role in judicial judgments over the last two
hundred years.11° Thus, he tends to accept the causal attributions of
courts and ignores the risk that his efficiency analysis is skewed by the
same error. More generally, he seems fairly uninterested in looking
for possible systemic (situationist) contributors to accident costs. In-
stead, he sees the most evident actors-the direct injurer and victim-
as the most relevant. And between those two parties, he tends to pre-
sume that the victim is primarily responsible, reflecting, we think, the
salience of the injured party and the dispositionist presumption that
outcomes reflect choices. To be sure, those dispositionist presump-
tions are rebuttable, but the threshold for doing so is set high, reflect-
ing the strength of the dispositionism.
To better understand Posner's attributional inclination, it may
first be helpful to provide some contrast.
b. Calabresi.-Calabresi's attributional scope when con-
fronting the problem of accident costs is far broader than Posner's.
Indeed, the very title of his book, The Costs of Accidents, is a telling clue
that Calabresi is interested not in making sense of tort doctrines and
the practices that resolve disputes and allocate losses between proto-
typical "injurers" and "victims," but in addressing the problem of sys-
tem-wide accident costs. Consequently, Calabresi is less interested in
determining which of those two parties may have behaved inefficiently
and far more interested in understanding what institutional and sys-
temic (that is, situational) forces give rise to many such accidents.
In The Costs of Accidents, Calabresi repeatedly cautions readers not
to be distracted by the salient parties involved and to look to the situa-
tion. Early on in the book, he calls it a "myth" "that the costs of an
accident [must] be borne only by the victim or by the party who may
110. This characterization of Posner's dispositionist presumptions is developed more
expansively in Hanson, Reyes & Schlanger, Attributional Positivism, supra note 15.
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in some sense be said to have injured him.""' And later he reminds
readers that
The effect of case-by-case decisions is to center on the partic-
ular or unusual cause of an accident. If one asks, as case-by-
case determinations tend to do, "What went wrong in this
case?" the answer will most likely center on the peculiar
cause. Yet there is a very good argument for the notion that
the cheapest way of avoiding accident costs is not to attempt
to control the unusual event but rather to modify a recurring
event. It may be that absentmindedness is a cause of one
particular accident, too much whiskey the cause of another,
and drowsiness the cause of a third. But it may also be that a
badly designed curve or inadequate tires are causes of each
of these as well." 2
The fault system, according to Calabresi, harmfully narrows the scope
of analysis. While Posner tends to zoom in on the conduct of the
parties in a lawsuit, Calabresi pans out to the situation. In large part
because of their attributional proclivities, the two scholars have very
different opinions about the tort system. While Posner celebrates the
efficiency of negligence law, Calabresi laments its myopic nature. In
his view, " [t] he fault system, because it centers on the possible particu-
lar cost avoider, is very likely to ignore the recurring cost avoider and
hence fail altogether to consider some potential cheapest cost
avoiders such as highway builders or tiremakers.""'
Posner has addressed this apparent difference between his ap-
proach and Calabresi's. He argues that, if in fact there were some way
to have prevented an accident at a cost lower than the burdens of
precaution for the parties to a lawsuit, then you can be sure that there
would soon enough be new parties to that lawsuit. There is nothing
"inherently bilateral" about tort litigation. 4 According to Posner, "a
plaintiff who was injured in an automobile accident that would have
been avoided either if the driver of the other car had been sober or if
the tires of that driver's car had not been defective would... sue both
the driver of the car and the manufacturer of the tires." '115 Thus, if a
party is not brought into a lawsuit, then that party must not have been
an efficient accident cost avoider. The burden is on the obvious ac-
tors-the victim and the direct injurer-to show that the other situa-
111. THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 4, at 17.
112. Id. at 256.
113. Id
114. Richard A. Posner, Guido Calabresi's The Costs of Accidents: A Reassessment, 64 MD.




tional actors are at fault. Until that can be shown decisively, "the
manufacturer of the automobile, the contractor who built the road-
way, [and] the city that installed (or failed to install) the traffic sig-
nals" remain literally "stranger[s] to the proceeding."'1 6
Calabresi is less inclined to impose such a burden. For a situa-
tionist like Calabresi, these individuals are not "strangers to the pro-
ceeding" but potentially important participants in the multilateral,
interconnected, web-like production of accident costs." t7
Posner's response assumes away the problem, which, again, is that
tort law is subject to the fundamental attribution error. Thus, if acci-
dent costs are the consequence of numerous, hard-to-see situational
forces, there is little hope that new parties will be added to a lawsuit,
because tort law-indeed, virtually all of our laws' ' 8-are themselves
highly dispositionist. They have no place for such situationist
claims."' That Posner has trouble appreciating this argument is, we
think, a symptom of the fact that the situation is itself difficult to ap-
preciate-another symptom of dispositionism.
4. Lawmaker Schema.-A fourth way to compare scholars' attribu-
tional propensity is to examine their lawmaker schema"2 -that is, the
extent to which the policy responses offered by scholars reflect atten-
tion to situational tendencies in those who apply the law. For in-
stance, is the scholar mindful of the human tendency to engage in,
say, defensive attributions or system legitimation, or does the scholar
116. Posner, Book Review, supra note 90, at 645.
117. To Calabresi, the process of assigning causation-indeed, the meaning of causa-
tion-is extremely complex. Posner, on the other hand, sees the area of accident law as a
relatively easy one to figure out, particularly given "the fact that accidents, unlike some
other important subjects of interest to the student of legal institutions, such as collusion,
are not covert." Id. at 648. Because much of what is important is visible, the efficiency
calculation is relatively straightforward.
It is noteworthy that Calabresi was a leader in challenging simpler notions of causation
upon which much legal theory and lay understanding had been based. He was perhaps the
first to suggest the economic significance of probabilistic notions of causation. See Guido
Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. CI. L.
REv. 69 (1975).
118. See generally Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 14, at 299-303 (describing
the dispositionist presumptions of several areas of law); Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational
Character, supra note 14 (same); Hanson, Reyes & Schlanger, Attributional Positivism, supra
note 15 (same with respect to tort law).
119. See generally Benforado, Hanson & Yosifon, Broken Scales, supra note 15 (describing
how the obesity epidemic is, in large measure, a reflection of situational forces and how,
because of the dispositionist presumptions, laws and lawmakers have done little to address
the epidemic).
120. We use the term "lawmaker" broadly to include all those individuals or institutions
that might help write or apply laws-from legislators to jurors.
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presume that the unexamined interpretations of those who decide
cases can be trusted as unbiased?121
a. Posner.-When Posner explicitly describes what moves
lawmakers, he is generally quite dispositionist in his approach.
Lawmakers are more or less presumed to be pursuing their own
ends.12 2 And often those are the prototypical ends of the rational ac-
tor-money, influence, votes, and the like.12 Judges, though, are a
little different than other lawmakers. As Judge Posner put it in rela-
tively recent work, the "insulation" of judges (particularly federal ap-
pellate judges) "from accountability . . . makes their behavior . . . a
challenge to the economic analysis of law, and more broadly, to the
universalist claims of the economic theory of human behavior."' 24
It is, in part, because of that judicial independence that Posner,
in many of his earlier writings on tort law, has little to say about the
underlying goals of the judges whose opinions he is explaining. 125
But that poses a problem, because it is hard to understand why self-
interested judges would tend to act as if their goal were to serve the
public interest-that is, the goal of wealth maximization.
Feeling the tension, Landes and Posner concede in their book on
the economic structure of tort law that they "have not explained the
incentive of judges to cooperate in the production of this good."126
Landes and Posner assert thatjudges' motives are probably sufficiently
public-spirited (and their situations sufficiently constrained) that they
will act more or less in the public interest:
[O]f course judges are not completely independent; and
persons are not likely to be elected or appointed as judges if
they do not share the basic values of the dominant political
121. In other work, the question of how to look at lawmakers from a critical realist per-
spective is developed in greater detail. See Chen & Hanson, Categorically Biased, supra note
15, at 1219-20, 1222-28; Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra note 14, at Part
IV; Ronald Chen &Jon Hanson, Theorizing Illusion: Some Laws Behind Our Laws (2005)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
122. E.g., Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELLJ. ECON. & MGMT. ScI.
335, 340 (1974).
123. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an
Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 877 (1975) (indicating that lawmakers are
prepared to trade laws for "campaign contributions, votes, implicit promises of future fa-
vors, and sometimes outright bribes").
124. RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAw 112 (1995) [hereinafter OVERCOMING LAW].
125. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 16, at 19 ("To regard judges as simply the agents
of legislators who have decided to provide an efficient law of torts as they have decided to
provide for the national defense ignores the fact that the judicial office is hedged about




groupings in society. We shall not attempt in this book to
develop a theory of judicial incentives and relate it to the
positive economic theory of tort law, but we feel on fairly safe
ground in assuming that judges are good enough agents of
society's dominant groups that if an efficient system of tort
law is demanded judges will supply it-although less consist-
ently than if they were perfect agents.1 27
We think it revealing that, in this instance, Landes and Posner are
notably situationist-emphasizing the incomplete autonomy of judges
and the powerful effects of the judicial selection processes, shared val-
ues, and the demands of "society's most dominant groups"-in the
service of their conclusion that judges act as if dispositionally moti-
vated to create rules that maximize wealth.' 28
Posner, like most of us, tends to look to situation only when moti-
vated to do so. 129 And, here, the motive for Posner to do so is fairly
strong. Where the dispositions of most actors are generally presumed
to be quite selfish and where the judge-made law is said to advance
public-interested rules, there needs to be a story for why judges would
create such rules. It is situationism to the rescue-but a limited and ad
hoc situationism meant only to advance the larger dispositionist
analysis. '
3 0
There is a related, but slightly different, point to make about Pos-
ner's acknowledgement of situation. Posner has attributed his own
change in views, in part, to a shift in his own situation from that of a
full-time academic to that of a judge. Indeed, he admits that his time
127. Id.
128. The validity of that positive claim is itself a subject of considerable doubt, but that is
a topic of other work. See, e.g.,J.M. Balkin, Too Good to Be True: The Positive Economic Theory
of Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1447 (1987) (reviewing LANDES & POSNER, supra note 16); Han-
son, Reyes & Schlanger, Attributional Positivism, supra note 15. For a criticism of Posner's
attempts to read economic efficiency goals into state statutes, see Paula M. Taffe, Imputing
the Wealth Maximization Principle to State Legislators, 63 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 311, 312 (1987)
("Judge Posner imputes to the legislature efficiency concerns that are not supported by the
language of the statute, the available legislative history or, in one case, statements of the
state supreme court .... [T]he use of economic analysis in statutory interpretation in-
volves unacceptable speculation and, more importantly, is violative of the judicial role and
potentially violative of federalism concerns.").
129. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 14, at 157-58.
130. More recently, Posner has described and analyzed possible elements of"the judicial
utility function," including "prestige," "the desire to promote the public interest," and
"avoiding reversal." POSNER, OVERCOMING LAw, supra note 124, at 117-18. In that sense,
Posner has provided a dispositionist account of judicial behavior. In our view, however,
Posner has simply dispositionalized several of the possible situational influences that may
well influence the behavior of many other actors in many other contexts, and he has done
so without providing a theory for when those factors, or which situational factors, should
be considered.
[VOL. 64:24
THE COSTS OF DISPOSITIONISM
on the bench has modified his dispositionist presumptions in favor of
market solutions and against governmental intervention:
[T]he experience of being a judge is bound to moderate
one's views. When you are dealing with large doctrinal pol-
icy issues in a rather abstract way, it's very easy to allow your
general outlook on things to carry you to foreordained con-
clusions. But when you are actually forced to consider both
sides of the case, often you realize there is more to be said on
the other side of the case than you might have thought. So a
lot of statutes that I would have ridiculed as preposterous in-
terventionism in the economy, when looked at up close in
the context of the specific case, make more sense. I have
learned there is more to be said for some of these interven-
tionist laws than I had initially thought."3 '
Posner's shift in perspective is to be predicted. Dispositionism is a
powerful baseline for all of us, and for most of us it is not until we "are
actually forced to consider both sides" of an issue that we can begin to
realize the importance of situational variables.
As these examples help to demonstrate, it is possible for even a
strong dispositionist to see matters from a situationist perspective
when his situation encourages it. But insofar as situations are stable,
as they typically are,132 the illusion of dispositionism persists.
b. Calabresi.-In contrast to Posner, when Calabresi consid-
ers lawmakers and regulators, the project inevitably involves delving
into the complexities of their interiors. While his approach in work
like The Costs of Accidents lacks the vocabulary and supporting evidence
of the field today, Calabresi has the instincts of a social psychologist.
As he tries to understand the way regulators behave, he uncovers
some of the human animal's central interior proclivities-from at-
tributional biases to cognitive dissonance and from motives to affirm
one's self, one's group, and one's system to the motive to provide le-
gitimating reasons for decisions.' 33
In fact, much of Calabresi's work criticizing the fault system of
liability reveals an implicit understanding of the fundamental attribu-
tion error. For instance, in the accident law context, Calabresi makes
the point that the fault system "emphasizes choices that are often illu-
131. Kurtz, supra note 50.
132. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 14, at 174-76.
133. All of those interior situational features are detailed in Hanson & Yosifon, The Situ-
ational Character, supra note 14, at Part III.
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sory and makes use of scapegoats." i" 4 In other words, notwithstand-
ing the disproportionate role played by situation in many cases,
"much of tort law hinges-even today-on fault and on reasonable-
ness of behavior. '  As Calabresi understands, using scapegoats ap-
peals to something in our interiors. There are reasons for the
fundamental attribution error-interior motivations-that Calabresi
realizes need to be identified and counteracted in order to achieve
the broader understanding of the law that both he and Posner seek.
As Calabresi also appreciates, policymakers are motivated to see
themselves as good, fair, and just. When a lawmaker or judge is com-
pelled by situational forces to take actions that challenge that self-con-
ception, he or she can cope with the resultant dissonance between
values and actions through various forms of self-deception. Thus, ac-
cording to Calabresi and Bobbitt, when lawmakers are forced to de-
cide between two conflicting values and, in effect, ignore one for the
sake of closure, they must engage in a sort of self-delusion: "Evasion,
disguise, temporizing, deception are all ways by which artfully chosen
allocation methods can avoid the appearance of failing to reconcile
values in conflict." '136 In the end, dispositionism is like a pair of blind-
134. CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATrITUDES, AND THE LAW, supra note 44, at 18. With
Philip Bobbitt, Calabresi has gone further and demonstrated an intuitive understanding of
many of the interior motives for a dispositionist worldview, including the motive to affirm
the legitimacy of the system:
The appeal of a fault or worthiness approach .. .goes beyond the fact that it
permits a greater use of an aresponsible agency; by transforming the decision,
society attempts to deny the tragic element implicit in the choice. Society an-
nounces that it will not choose to sacrifice lives or fundamental rights, that it will
not violate conceptions of equality, that the sacrifices which do occur are due not
to a societal unwillingness to forgo other goods but to individual failings.... We
do not think tragic choices are to be understood without realizing society's com-
pounding of sacrifice with blame, of insult with injury if you will, in order to
absolve itself. The literal origins in this practice of the word scapegoat should warn
us of the awful dangers of its appeal.
CALABREsi & BoaBrrr, supia note 44, at 76-77.
Similarly, Calabresi reveals some harmful effects of dispositionist out-grouping when
exploring the suggestion that "insurance categories be based not on outside characteristics
but rather on previous driving records"-a suggestion, he points out, "much favored by all
right thinking people like the editorial writers of the New York Times." CALABRESI, IDEALS,
BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, AND THE LAw, supra note 44, at 38. There are problems with such
experience-based categories because
Individual members of those groups find themselves disproportionately charged
with the financial burden of accidents, and are-unnecessarily, if past accidents
are poor predictors of future ones-kept from future participation. In addition,
society tells them that they have no one to blame but themselves, for the standard
is one which even the Times finds unbiased.
Id. at 39.
135. CALABRESI, IDEAS, ATTITUDES, AND THE LAw, supra note 44, at 18.
136. CALABRESI & BOBBrr, supra note 44, at 26.
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ers. It is a means of not seeing what might trouble us, a way of believ-
ing that everything is all right-that we are safe, that our groups are
deserving, and that our systems are fair and safe from collapse.1"7
Calabresi also suggests the importance of cognitive biases-sali-
ence, counterfactual thinking, and elastic justification, among
others-in shaping the way that we see policies. A decision not to save
a particular life is far different than a decision not to invest in technol-
ogies that might reduce the death rate."' By way of illustration, Cala-
bresi and Bobbitt urge us to
Consider the different attitude we all share toward the fail-
ure of Congress to pass truly effective safety legislation, as
against the attitude we would have were it unwilling to appro-
priate funds for the rescue of a trapped hostage. Lives may
be discarded in both examples, but the choice is less exposed
in the first case and therefore less destructive of some of the
basic values involved.
139
The example seems again to reveal an understanding of the funda-
mental attribution error. When harms are caused situationally-ab-
sent any obvious choice on the part of anyone other than the victim-
there is no one to blame (except, perhaps, the victim). But situation
is not, despite perceptions, given. Situations, too, can be framed as
the consequence of choice, and when they are, our reactions change.
In Ideals, Beliefs, Attitudes, and the Law, Calabresi shows us how the situ-
ation-in this case, the absence of effective safety legislation-can be
reframed as a dispositionist choice, an evil deity who offers
a gift, a boon, which would make life more pleasant, more
enjoyable than it is today . . . anything you want . . . in ex-
change for one thing . . . the lives of one thousand young
men and women picked by him at random who will each
year die horrible deaths.14 °
Without the explicit choice offered by the evil deity we can continue
on with the naive belief that "our society does not establish an accept-
able number of auto deaths, but that this figure results from
thousands of independent, atomistic actions."' 4 t As we would put it,
137. These themes are central to the critical realist project. See, e.g., Chen & Hanson,
Illusion of Law, supra note 15; Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra note 14;
Benforado & Hanson, Naive Cynicism, supra note 15.
138. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra note 14, at Part III.B.2.c
(describing counterfactual thinking and the act-omission bias).
139. CALABRESI & BoBBrrr, supra note 44, at 40.
140. CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, AND THE LAW, supra note 44, at 1.
141. CALABREsi & BOBaarr, supra note 44, at 20; see also id. (stating that "when the first-
order determination of a tragic choice appears to be no more than a dependent function
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where the deaths are situationally caused, we tend not to see them or
mind them. Place the same deaths at the end of one person's choice
to harm another-particularly when that person is maliciously moti-
vated-and the deaths take on a new meaning and our anger at, and
desire to punish, the wrongdoer become overwhelming. 14 2
B. The Situational Sources of Attributional Perspective
Part II.A focused on comparing Posner's and Calabresi's substan-
tive policy analyses to determine the extent of their dispositionism.
We did not explicitly seek out or highlight any possible situational
sources-internal or external-for the scholars' dispositions. That is
the topic of Part II.B, which looks to evidence in each scholar's situa-
tion that might help explain a propensity toward dispositionism or
situationism.
For several reasons, this is bound to be a speculative and contro-
versial exercise. To begin with, the power of the social psychological
evidence discussed above lies mostly in what it tells us about humans,
generally, in this culture. None of this evidence can fully explain a
specific individual's attributional tendencies in a particular context.
Furthermore, we do not have enough information about the attribu-
tional dispositions of Calabresi and Posner to say anything with much
confidence. Although the evidence we do offer seems to confirm our
claims about Posner's and Calabresi's relative attributional styles, we
caution the reader to treat the following analysis in the spirit in which
it is offered: a potentially illuminating and somewhat suggestive, but
far from conclusive or complete, explanation for Posner's relative dis-
positionism and Calabresi's relative situationism."' 3
of the second order, it will usually be the case that the connection is illusory, serving to
obscure the fact of tragic scarcity and-while the illusion lasts-evading the tragic
choice").
142. In some ways, the changing perceptions of the tobacco industry over the last two
decades reflect that very sort of dynamic. For a summary of the evidence that led to that
shift in attributions of causation, responsibility, and blame, see Jon D. Hanson & Douglas
A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARv. L.
REV. 1420 (1999).
143. Wherever possible, we will rely on Calabresi's and Posner's own assessments of their
interiors (in particular, their motivations and aims), rather than attempting to draw con-
clusions from particular exterior situations. We avoid, for instance, conjecturing on how a
brief encounter with the Rosenberg children after their parents were put to death might
have shaped Posner's dispositionism. Although others have highlighted that experience,
Posner thinks it more memorable than meaningful:
I didn't "know" the Rosenberg kids. Their stepparents, friends of my mother,
brought them to our house to receive my electric trains (which I had outgrown),
and I showed them how to work the trains and that was that. The only reason I
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Second, people often resent being categorized, or seeing people
they identify with being categorized, along the political spectrum. As
the sentiment is sometimes expressed, "labels are for cans." There are
likely numerous reasons for that aversion, some of which connect to
ideas discussed above. Naive realism,144 for instance, may offer signifi-
cant insight into our widely shared distaste for political labels. Insofar
as we see ourselves as unbiased, independent, autonomous, discerners
of truth, labels pegging us as potentially beholden to, and biased by, a
political ideology may conflict with our positive self-image. Labels
that seem tailor-made for others feel uncomfortable against our own
skin. The blue bow tie of conservatism seems to constrict our intake
of oxygen, even as critics suggest it suits us. Furthermore, as with any
situational influence, we tend to have better access than others do to
our own attitudes and positions. We believe we know where they
come from and how they differ from the positions associated with a
particular ideology. Because of our privileged access to our own inter-
iors, others insult us when they boil our complex opinions down into
a single word-particularly when that word is often wielded
disparagingly."'
With those concerns expressed, we now throw caution to the
wind and turn to a situational view of Posner's and Calabresi's con-
trasting attributional tendencies. We begin with Posner and Cala-
bresi's shared exterior situation, before turning to each scholar's
unique individual interior and exterior situations.
1. Calabresi and Posner's Shared Exterior Situation.-To set the
backdrop for more localized situational influences, it is useful to con-
sider briefly the historical environment in which Calabresi and Posner
each began to form his approach to legal scholarship. By considering
remember their visit is the notoriety of their recently executed parents. The brief
encounter could hardly have influenced my mature thought.
E-mail from Richard Posner, supra note 37.
We will try to take into consideration instances where Posner offers his own assessment
of his proclivities and tastes. In the few cases where we highlight exterior situation, we do
so because we find the environmental elements to be particularly noteworthy and the
causal connection to be particularly strong. As discussed earlier, it should not be forgotten
that exterior situation does play a vital role in shaping how we see the world.
144. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (discussing the theory of naive realism).
145. This is a variant of the actor-observer bias (seeing the role of situation far more
readily for ourselves or for members of our groups than we do for others or members of
other groups). See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 14, at 157 n.ll0.
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the situation they shared in common, it may be possible to better un-
derstand what distinguished them.'4 6
As indicated previously, our baseline dispositionism is only a start-
ing point on both an individual and societal level. Shifts in our envi-
ronment-whether they are cultural developments, scientific
breakthroughs, changes in business practices, or otherwise-can lead
us to see more or less of the situation. Relatedly, anyone powerful
enough to manipulate our environment can also manipulate the
strength of our dispositionism 47
The 1960s and 1970s-when both Calabresi and Posner were de-
veloping their most important work on accident law-marked a dis-
tinct shift in the way many within academia and without approached
the most important policy questions. During that time, people began
seriously to question some of their dispositionist presumptions. There
was a growing understanding that situation was, indeed, a major influ-
ence and that existing situations were as much man-made and altera-
ble as they were natural and fixed. In particular, the system-
legitimating, dispositionist accounts of race and gender were being
challenged, and, as those challenges gained traction (much of it com-
ing from within academia and the media), situationist conceptions be-
gan to trickle into law and legal theory. The "consciousness raising"
associated with various movements was, in part, a heightened aware-
ness about the role of situation in outcomes that had historically been
treated as neutral in origin and effect.
Those trends touched many areas of law. The policies associated
with the "war on poverty," for instance, were designed to address the
situational forces that led to poverty more than they were intended as
a battle against identifiable individuals. Similarly, within tort law,
scholars started to look more expansively at systems, enterprises, and
situations, and to go beyond the dispositionist focus on salient, choice-
making "injurers" and "victims." Legal realists had pushed in that di-
rection for decades,14 and their tort-specific influence, combined
with the larger, cultural developments, ultimately undermined the
146. The very brief history contained in this Section is a concise, assertion-based sum-
mary of other work now in progress. See Benforado & Hanson, Naive Cynicism, supra note
15.
147. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 14, at 229-31 (arguing that disposi-
tionism in America generally reflects the shared goals and collective efforts of commercial
interests); see also Benforado, Hanson & Yosifon, Broken Scales, supra note 15 (same, with
particular focus on the food, health, and diet industries).
148. For a description and dispositionist critique of that trend and the arguments be-
hind it, see George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intel-
lectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985).
[VOL. 64:24
THE COSTS OF DISPOSITIONISM
simplistic idea that accident law should be formulated by answering
the question: Who pays when A hits B?
Particularly during the 1960s, scholars and judges were increas-
ingly apt to step back and consider injuries in their context-as taking
place within a situation. From that vantage point, there was more to
see than just the A and B of a given case. There were classes of As and
Bs, and institutional forces and incentives hedging them about.
Wealth, power, and larger socioeconomic dynamics became a central
part of any analysis. To be sure, looking at the injury without looking
at the situation was tantamount to learning the pronunciation of a
word without learning its meanings and connotations.
With the general push towards situationism underway, legal aca-
demics could respond in at least two ways: they could generally em-
brace the movement or they could generally reject it. Just as many
chose to expand upon these new attributions, many others lashed
back in an attempt to legitimate the systems that were being upended
by situationist thinking. In the following Sections we argue that, be-
cause of their situations, Calabresi endorsed situationism while Posner
worked to reinforce dispositionism.
2. Posner's Exterior Situation.-Although there was no course in
Chicago-style economics-and very little economics at all-when Pos-
ner was a student at Harvard Law School in the late 1950s and early
1960s,' 49 he was nonetheless exposed to powerful scholarship re-
sponding to the situationist impulses and claims of legal realism. As
legal realism had made its primary home at Yale, 151 the legal process
school was coloring the halls at Harvard. 151 In response to legal real-
ism, legal process scholars set out to legitimate the law. In part, re-
jecting the wide-ranging gaze of realists and the open-ended and
often ambiguous nature of their scholarship, legal process scholars at-
tempted to construct a new consensus and prove that there was some
greater purpose moving the law.'
52
149. Edmund W. Kitch, The Fire of Truth: A Remembrance of Law and Economics at Chicago,
1932-1970, 26J.L. & EcON. 163, 198 (1983).
150. Eugene Rostow put it this way: legal realism "has represented the prevailing ap-
proach to legal studies at the Yale Law School to a greater extent than has been the case in
any other law faculty of the world." EUGENE V. RosTow, THE SOVEREIGN PREROGATIVE: THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE QUEST FOR LAw XV (1962).
151. Lucas Powe, Jr. has called legal process "the Harvard jurisprudence." L.A. Powe,
Jr., Justice Douglas After Fifty Years: The First Amendment, McCarthyism and Rights, 6 CONST.
COMMENT. 267, 267-68 (1989).
152. Describing the situation that helped shape the legal process school, Duncan Ken-
nedy explains that a "search was on, from World War II onwards, for a new method to
replace the deductive approach of the late nineteenth century with some criterion for
2005]
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Although Posner appears not to have been persuaded by many of
the answers of the legal process school, he seems to have adopted
their questions. That is, when imagining what a legal theory should
aspire to, Posner appears to have been influenced by the legal process
school's ambition to make sense of existing arrangements.153 As Pos-
ner describes:
The positive analysts [within law and economics] such as my-
self resemble traditional doctrinal analysts in believing that
there really are rules of law-that the law is not wholly a mat-
ter of judicial discretion, as the more extreme Legal Realists
believed. We use economics to inquire to what extent the
common law is a coherent system of rules concerned with
promoting efficiency. 54
Posner's move to the West Coast and then to Chicago several
years after law school brought him into contact with a new breed of
dispositionist scholar-economists who had clear and simple intu-
itions about what moved the human animal and what, therefore, the
ambitions of policy should be.'55 During his first year teaching at
Stanford, Posner met Aaron Director and George Stigler, both visiting
from the University of Chicago.' 56 Through them he made the ac-
quaintance of Ronald Coase and Milton Friedman.'5 7
judicial lawmaking other than open-ended, contextualized policy analysis, one that would
be plausibly non-political." Duncan Kennedy, Law and Economics from the Perspective of Criti-
cal Legal Studies, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 468 (Pe-
ter Newman ed., 1998).
153. The efficiency theory that Posner was to develop went as far as any theory before it
in making sense of the law. The power of that theory is evident today in most common-law
courses where efficiency explanations for basic doctrines are standard fare in the readings
and in classroom discussion. Still, Posner's work represents only an early step in the effi-
ciency or libertarian backlash against situationism. As other dispositionist scholars joined
in and the topic turned from tort law generally to products liability specifically, many of
Posner's erstwhile supporters criticized him for being insufficiently dispositionist. We de-
scribe that process in other work now in progress. See Benforado & Hanson, Naive Cyni-
cism, supra note 15.
154. Richard A. Posner, The Present Situation in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1113, 1120(1981) [hereinafter Present Situation]; see also Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note
14, at 189-90 (summarizing Posner's legal-theoretic ambitions).
155. See Chen & Hanson, Illusion of Law, supra note 15, at 7-31 (describing the general
policy scripts of Chicago School economists at the time).
156. MacFarquhar, supra note 50, at 86.
157. See Kurtz, supra note 50. Kurtz quotes Judge Posner as follows:
Aaron Director had retired. He was living near Stanford and had an office in the
Stanford Law School. I recognized the name when I started teaching at Stanford
in 1968, and I went into his office and introduced myself. I became very friendly
with him. Then in that spring quarter, George Stigler visited Stanford, and
through Aaron I became very friendly with George. Through Aaron Director I
was put on a task force on antitrust policy for the president-elect, the infamous
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Posner found their simple approach appealing and relevant for
understanding law. As Posner explains, "I think Ronald and Aaron
share a quality of being able to demonstrate the power of a simple
economic model, and a simple economic model clearly described is
something that lawyers find accessible."' 5  Whether it was primarily a
result of his interactions with dispositionist scholars or more a result
of earlier situational influences, by the late 1960s Posner was well on
his way to becoming a solid dispositionist, a move that was solidified a
year later when he accepted a position at the University of Chicago
where he would join those economists and others like them.1
59
Economics at Chicago was different than at other schools, espe-
cially Yale, a difference that implicated the way law and economics
evolved at the two universities. At Chicago, the economics depart-
ment, which was defined by its dispositionism and more general quest
for simple, pro-market theories, was ascendant.16 ° It had a major ef-
fect on many of the departments at Chicago-not least of which was
the law school.1 6 At Yale, the economics department had little im-.
pact on the law school, where legal realism reigned and economists
Nixon. The task force was headed by George Stigler, and Ronald Coase was one
of the members. I met Milton shortly afterwards. That year I learned about the
Chicago approach to antitrust.
Id.
158. Kitch, supra note 149, at 226.
159. MacFarquhar, supra note 50, at 86.
160. Cf Kitch, supra note 149, at 176 ("If you look at the way Yale, in that period,
thought of an economist it w-as no different from how they thought of a sociologist. As far
as I can remember, it was only at Chicago that you had what we call economics put into the
law in that way.").
161. The Chicago School movement also had attracted funding from private sources
seeking to "promote private enterprise." The Volker Fund, set up by a wholesale furniture
distributor to provide funds to certain types of scholarship, brought a number of important
economic scholars to Chicago. Id. at 180 n.22. As Aaron Director articulates:
What happened was that Hayek, through, I think, Hardy, met a person called
Luhnow, who was then responsible for a lot of money in the Volker Fund. He
persuaded Luhnow to give a certain sum of money to establish a center that
would promote private enterprise. It was earlier decided that Chicago was the
only place that was likely to accept such a project, and it was decided that the law
school was the only part of the University of Chicago that would accept such a
project.
Henry Simons was the one who suggested to Hayek that I should be the per-
son in charge of the project. Apparently the dean of the law school, Wilbur Katz,
then wrote in one condition. It was that I should be permitted to teach one
course in the law school. The course, of course, was economic analysis. Henry
Simons had tired of teaching it by then and had been trying to get the law school
to get me to teach it.
Id. at 180-81 (footnote omitted). For a history of the importance of Hayek and the Chi-
cago School's influence on policymaking, see Chen & Hanson, Illusion of Law, supra note
15, at Part II.B.2.
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looked more like sociologists and less like their Chicago counterparts.
And it seems that members of the two law schools saw little worth
emulating in the approach taken by the other. Indeed, as Milton
Friedman has stated, "[t]he natural development of legal economics
at the University of Chicago then centered on a person [Henry
Simons] who was opposed to almost everything that the institutional-
ists and legal realists stood for."162 Unsurprisingly, "law and econom-
ics" had a different flavor at each institution. As Posner would later
describe, "[t] he normative branch of the economic analysis of law can
be viewed as a direct descendant of Legal Realism, by way of Guido
Calabresi; the positive branch comes from outside the law, from the
work of economists such as Ronald Coase and Gary Becker." 163
3. Posner's Interior Situation.-One of the difficulties in discuss-
ing the interior situations that we believe led Posner and Calabresi to
be more or less dispositionist is that dispositionism is itself an interior
situation. Few of us are consciously aware of attributional tendencies
that we, or others, have. We view the world through attributional
lenses that we perceive as neutral, though they are not. Dispositonism
is a schematic force that shapes the way we see, interpret, interact
with, and remember our environs. One way of demonstrating that a
person is a dispositionist, therefore, is by showing that he behaves like
a dispositionist-and tends to emphasize disposition and to downplay
situation in his attributions. It is another version of the basic "walks
like a duck, quacks like a duck" test for identifying ducks. We have
already provided some of that evidence above. Posner walks and
quacks like a dispositionist.
But there are other ways of demonstrating the interior situational
sources of dispositionism. For this purpose, we will look to less direct
but still quite revealing evidence of characteristics that social scientists
have discovered correlate with the brand of dispositionism that Posner
exhibits. Specifically, we will consider the work of George Lakoff on
the morality models of conservatism and liberalism'64 and the work of
John Jost and his colleagues regarding the cognitive and motivational
antecedents or underpinnings of dispositionism.
a. The Strict Father.-Through his work in cognitive linguis-
tics, George Lakoff has identified the guiding conservative model of
162. Kitch, supra note 149, at 176.
163. Posner, Present Situation, supra note 154, at 1120 (footnotes omitted).
164. As we describe elsewhere, the conceptual schemas underlying conservatism are
closely linked to dispositionism. See Benforado & Hanson, Naive Cynicism, supra note 15.
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morality as the "strict father."' 6 5 Under that "strict father model,"
children are born bad and must be made good through discipline.
Properly raised, children become personally responsible for their lives
as they mature-they either succeed as self-reliant entities making free
choices or they fail, in which case they deserve to be cut loose to face
up to the hard discipline of the outside world.
16 6 That view is in con-
trast to the liberal "nurturant parent model." Nurturant parents at-
tempt to be responsive to their children's needs, "[to] nurture them,
and raise their children to nurture others."
'6 7 More than anything
else, "In]urturance requires empathy and responsibility."
168
Posner, in that sense, is a strict father.'
69 Throughout his writ-
ings, he reveals a strong presumption that individuals should operate
as self-reliant and disciplined entities, and, as such, do not require
nannying and do not merit special assistance.
17 ° Thus, Posner's affin-
ity for Nietzsche:
The idea-a bit banal, I'm afraid, when stated in summary
form-is that a person is responsible for his own life. Exter-
nal forces and events are just the raw materials out of which
we make a life, and we have no right to blame anyone else
for the result because it was ours to make or muff.'
7 1
165. Lakoff's work is discussed in significantly more detail in Nahie Cynicism. 
See id.
Briefly, Lakoff suggests that liberals and conservatives adopt the distinct positions 
that they
do based on each side's conception of "morality," at the center of which is a 
cognitive
model of the family. Id. These models and their associated conceptual metaphors 
make
political positions appear moral or immoral. Id; see GEORGE LAKOFF, MORAL 
POLITICS:
How LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES THINK (2d ed. 2002).
166. See Benforado & Hanson, Naive Cynicism, supra note 15.
167. See The Rockridge Institute, The Progressive Worldview, available at http://
www.rockridgeinstitute.org/pr(ects/strategic/nationasfamily/npworldview/view (last vis-
ited Nov. 22, 2004).
168. Id.
169. We are not making any claims as to the nature of Posner's interactions with actual
members of his family. See LAKoir, supra note 165, at 364 (explaining that a person might
adopt "the Nurturant Parent mode for [his] family life and the Strict Father model for
politics"). Posner assures us that his children found him anything but strict.
170. It may be noted that in his private life, Posner seems to demand a similar sort 
of
rational self-reliance. MacFarquhar, supra note 50, at 78, 80. Jokingly, he likens his person-
ality to that of a cat. Id. at 80.
171. Id. at 86. According to MacFarquahar:
Nietzsche is perhaps the philosopher who has had the deepest influence on Pos-
ner. Posner takes from him a conception of morality (made by humans, not
found in the world), a conception of ethics (tenth-hand bromides, clung to by
those lacking the courage or imagination to think for themselves), and, most of





Similarly, Posner shows little patience for the nurturant parent alter-
native. In Indiana Harbor, for instance, Posner makes clear his view
that the residents threatened by the chemical spill are adults, who are
responsible for their own circumstances and are not to be coddled. 7 2
Similarly, when the lawyers for the plaintiff suggested that the defen-
dant's wealth was far greater than the plaintiffs, Posner's response
was "so what?" '173 More generally, Posner is intolerant of moralisms
and seems uninterested in living in or fostering a "nurturing" environ-
ment for himself or anyone else.' 74 Such basic beliefs about a per-
son's success or failure in life are the stuff out of which Posner builds
his particularly potent brand of dispositionism.
b. Underlying Motivations.-In their recent work, Professors
Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, and Sulloway have identified a number of
motivations that underlie conservatism-and, we would argue, dis-positionism. Specifically, they found that conservatism is positively
correlated with "dogmatism and intolerance of ambiguity; uncertainty
avoidance; fear of threat, loss, and death; system instability; and episte-
mic needs to achieve order, structure, and closure, as well as nega-
tively related to openness to experience, integrative complexity, and(to a lesser extent) self-esteem."' 75 Part of the reason that people
adopt a conservative outlook is that "it serves to reduce fear, anxiety,
and uncertainty; to avoid change, disruption, and ambiguity; and to
explain, order, and justify inequality among groups and individu-
als."' 76 As we illustrate in the following paragraphs, those (interior
situational) motivations seem far stronger in Posner than in Calabresi.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 53-58 (discussing Posner's Indiana Harbor
opinion).
173. Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. Am. Cynamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174, 1182 (7th Cir. 1990).174. Some have attributed Posner's disdain for moralisms to his disdain for his mother's
communist sympathies. See MacFarquahar, supra note 50, at 84 (citing Posner's friend,Martha Nussbaum). Posner describes his mother, who was a teacher in New York City
public schools, as
one of these bright fools.., quite a bright person, but very limited. The otherthing that annoyed me about her was that I worried about her politics interfering
with my career.... It was an annoying piece of baggage. Then eventually shebecame senile and forgot about politics and actually became very benign .... I
breathed a sigh of relief.
Id. at 83.
175. John T. Jost et al., Exceptions That Prove the Rule-Using a Theory of Motivated SocialCognition to Account for Ideological Incongruities and Political Anomalies: Reply to Greenberg andJonas (2003), 129 PSYCHOL. BULL. 383, 383 (2003) [hereinafter Exceptions That Prove the
Rule].
176. John T. Jost et al., Political Conservatism as Motivated Social Cognition, 129 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 339, 340 (2003).
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Posner's entire project is intended as a clear, simple explanation
for tort law (indeed, the entire common law) as is. And, to achieve
that end, he routinely resists or assumes away complicating considera-
tions. Thus, Posner continues to assert the benefits of the single maxi-
mand of wealth maximization, even as he recognizes that it favors the
wealthy.1 7 For him, the goal of tractability overrides any desire for a
more normatively attractive model.
Posner's self-descriptions seem similarly to confirm that his is a
conservative disposition. His need for order, structure, and closure in
his scholarship and writing 7 8 seems to define his life habits as well.
Posner describes himself as "rigid and Germanic" in his adherence to
a strict routine1 79 (although he stresses that those labels are more as-
pirational than achieved"'°). And his critical gaze is not just aimed
internally.
Posner is intolerant of ambiguity in the writing of his peers.'
Moreover, when confronted with evidence that people's behavior
does not comport with his simplistic model, he often resists that evi-
dence as flawed, reinterprets it as consistent with his model, and indi-
cates that the more complex depictions of human behavior pose a
threat to the system-frequently by invoking the specter of
totalitarianism. 82
177. See, e.g., POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, 1st ed., supra note 47, at 13-14 (discussing the
distributional effects of wealth maximization).
178. Posner's attack on critical legal studies in The Problems of Jurisprudence is typical:
Critical legal studies has not yet penetrated a single area of law, partly because of
the confrontational, 6pater les bourgeois style of many of its practitioners, partly be-
cause its politics are extremely left-wing, but mainly because of its all-encompass-
ing negativism about the possibility of either coherent doctrine or constructive
reform. This negativism acts as a damper on useful proposals for changing or
reconceptualizing legal doctrines.
POSNER, PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 27, at 441.
179. MacFarquhar, supra note 50, at 82 ("Posner doesn't like to waste time, so he sticks
to a routine .... But it is notjust his regular habits that allow him to be as productive as he
is: he has structured his life so as to free his mind from any distractions whatsoever.").
180. E-mail from Richard Posner, supra note 37.
181. Posner seems unsettled by scholarship that critiques without offering counter-solu-
tions. In his reassessment of The Costs of Accidents, appearing in this issue, he renews his
criticism of Calabresi in this regard-haranguing him for attacking the fault system as "irra-
tional" and "absurd" without offering a "substitute." Posner, A Reassessment, supra note 114,
at 18 (quoting THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 4, at 276, 285). As Posner laments,
Calabresi "discusses many alternatives, but discards them all." Id. Calabresi's scholarship is
built around ambiguity, and it is not surprising that Posner has trouble accepting it.
182. See, e.g., Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 14, at 186 (discussing Posner's
criticism of work in the field of behavioral economics); see also Hanson & Yosifon, The
Situational Character, supra note 14, at Part V.C.1 (describing Posner's "counterfeit
realism").
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Posner seems particularly fearful of societal instability. Indeed,he explains that part of the reason he began to drift towards the right
during the end of the sixties was because "he disliked the disorder of
the student riots."' 3 In 2001, he indicated that he travels abroad in-frequently because he is "prone to anxieties about foreign thieves and
muggers." 18
4
Posner seems eager to shelter himself from the threats of the
world. He went to college at the age of sixteen and admits that, in the
years that followed, he had few interests and engaged in few activities
outside of his work.18 5 Today, too, he prefers to avoid social life and
describes his relationship with his wife "as the traditional Jewish one,in which the pasty-faced scholar husband stays home and studies while
the wife attends to worldly activities." ' 6 It is notjust a matter of being
a workaholic: Posner may want to be a prolific scholar and a respectedjudge, but his bookish habits may also reflect his aversion to uncer-
tainty, world experiences, and unstable social situations.
Consistent with that dispositionist disposition, Posner is also un-
troubled by inequality.'8 7 In his scholarship, he rejects any concep-
tion of economic equality as a legal goal' and excludes distributional
considerations from the vast majority of his policy analyses.' 89 Wherehe does champion redistribution, the purpose is to protect rich peo-
ples' possessions against envious poverty-stricken hordes.'t °
183. MacFarquhar, supra note 50, at 86.
184. Id. at 82.
185. See id. at 83. Additionally, Posner has stated, "If I'd had more interests or activities
and lost that work time, I think my career would have suffered." Id.
186. Id. at 82.
187. As MacFarquhar writes, "One reason [Posner] could never be a liberal (in the cur-
rent sense of the word) is that, like many conservatives, he finds the idea of ordinary happi-
ness uninspiring. He has no interest in a politics whose goal is to give people shelter and
enough to eat. He loves fierceness and glory and heroism." Id. at 83.
188. POSNER, PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 27, at 381-82.
189. See Chen & Hanson, Distribution Versus Efficiency, supra note 41 (summarizingPosner's view); Hager, supra note 27, at 19 (noting that Posner "repeatedly omits consider-
ation of distributional factors relevant to his efficiency analyses and conclusions").
190. See POSNER, PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 27, at 344; cf Richard A. Pos-
ner, Equality, Wealth, and Political Stability, 13 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 344, 344 (1997) (arguing
that increasing "average incomes in a society ... increases[s] political stability). By focus-ing on "envy"-a personal failing-Posner again shows himself to be a solid dispositionist.Cf Hager, supra note 27, at 20 ("His focus on envy, moreover, identifies the problem as adefective state of mind among the poor, rather than as the social order which perpetuatespoverty and yields such a state of mind. Posner seems to defend redistribution, yet readers
who accept his premises will easily conclude that envy is a moral flaw among the poor for
which a response of redistribution is not warranted."). Posner also has a habit of interpret-ing criticism as envy-motivated. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 14, at 143-44 (noting Posner's response to criticisms of the study of law and economics). Similarly,
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Calabresi characterizes Posner's indifference to inequality as gen-
uine and suggests that it is a valid personal belief; at the same time he
criticizes Posner for assuming that blind wealth maximization is the
aim of all members of society:
I do not doubt that there exists an unspecified complex of
goals-that can be spoken of injustice-value terms-that are
better served by wealth-maximization, without redistribution,
than by other "measurable" instruments. I also do not doubt
that Dick Posner, in a not totally systematic way (of which as I
said I do not disapprove), "holds" these goals. I only suggest
that in holding to these, he is in a very small minority. And I
would suspect that most people would say, and indeed do
say, "Your goals, Richard, are fine for you, but without a lot
more in the way of equality (pass, for now, of what) they are
totally unacceptable to me."191
As we shall see in the following Sections, Calabresi counts himself in
the mass of people who care deeply about equality.
4. Calabresi's Exterior Situation.-Calabresi began his academic
career during the 1950s at Yale-a place heavily influenced by, and
indebted to, the legal realist legacy. As Laura Kalman describes:
A remarkable ferment in legal education had occurred at
Yale during [Wesley] Sturges's deanship. Between 1948 and
1954, Yale professors published twelve new casebooks. Half
of the faculty-thirteen of its twenty-six members-had par-
ticipated in the preparation of those casebooks. All of them
reflected the impact of legal realism.... [R] eviewers during
the late 1940s and early 1950s generally admitted that Yale
law professors had subordinated legal doctrine to factual sit-
uations in their casebooks, employed a large amount of non-
legal material, and considered issues of social policy.
192
Thus, the scholars around Calabresi were much more sensitive to the
insights of social science, including social psychology, than at Harvard
or the University of Chicago, and more likely to take up destabilizing,
situationist views.193 In 1956, changes in the Yale curriculum pushed
Posner prefers economic analysis because it ignores questions of power, 
and he criticizes
those social scientists who attempt to take power seriously. Id. at 196-97.
191. Guido Calabresi, About Law and Economics: A Letter to Ronald Dworkin, 8 HOFSTRA 
L.
REV. 553, 557 (1980) [hereinafter Letter to Thorkin].
192. LAuRA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960, at 193 (1986).
193. Posner himself has recognized the important influence of legal realism on Cala-
bresi's work: "Calabresi's brand of normative economic analysis of law shares with 
Legal




the trend further by emphasizing specialization and interdisciplinary
programs. 9 4 While at Chicago pure economists were teaching
courses and the discipline was being held up as distinct and superior
to the law's conceptions of "fairness" and 'justice," at Yale the empha-
sis, as articulated by Dean Eugene Rostow, was for law, economics, and
the rest of the social sciences to be incorporated "within the single
human mind":
After talking a great deal over the years about integrating law
and other social sciences, we propose to do it on a muchlarger scale than it has ever been done before-not in theinterest of making lawyers into economists, historians, or
sociologists, but in order to make them better and more
deeply trained lawyers.' 95
In the words of G. Edward White, this suggested that "lawyers could
use other disciplines, such as sociology, economics, psychology, or his-
tory, but they need not become steeped in other disciplines: their role
after all was to 'translate knowledge 
. . . into a just and workable
plan."' 196
That environmental contrast may go some distance towards ex-plaining the ultimate directions that Posner and Calabresi took. In
Calabresi's estimation:
The lawyer economist uses law to push economic theory just
as much as economic theory to push law. The difference,
say, between me and someone like Dick Posner ... [is that]
Dick uses economic theory to deal with law, [while I] use law
to change economic theory and then economic theory also
for law ... 197
For Calabresi, the relationship is an exchange-one of many that ap-
pear in his work.
Calabresi's academic environment was certainly influential in
shaping his approach to legal scholarship, but so were his interactions
outside the classroom and library. Like Posner, Calabresi's friend-
ships seem to have helped sculpt his attributional outlook, giving form
to his situationism. Indeed, one of his close classmates at Yale actually
took part in Milgram's famous experiments studying the power of un-
wishes to do away with fault as the basic guide to allocating liability in accident cases."
Posner, Present Situation, supra note 154, at 1120.
194. See KALMAN, supra note 192, at 204.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Interview with Guido Calabresi in New Haven, Conn. (Mar. 26, 2004).
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seen situation to influence human behavior. 1
98 In addition, several
members of Calabresi's family were doctors, a few actually psycholo-
gists, a fact that partially explains his interest in the study of human
behavior. 9 ' Calabresi notes being particularly affected by his
"brother's experience as a cancer researcher doing experiments and
trying as hard as he could to get people to be in a position where they
could consent as freely as possible and yet realizing at least at some
level that it was never free. '2°° While Milgram's studies may have had
only a latent influence, the mark of his brother's experience is more
evident. Indeed, in Ideals, Beliefs, Attitudes, and the Law, Calabresi of-
fers examples that draw directly from the ethical dilemmas his brother
faced as a doctor.20 1
Calabresi's situationism is less the product of one or two key
events and more the consequence of a developing nexus. Early situa-
tional forces interacted with later ones, as Calabresi himself
underscores:
I think when I write, I write without trying to push a particu-
lar agenda. I write as a scholar. On the other hand, I am
who I am. And when I describe myself in particular ways it's
because I think it is inevitable that we are shaped by our ex-
periences. And so, while I am not trying to push an agenda,
I follow the truth where I think it leads me, though the heav-
ens fall .... On the other hand, how can I say I am not apt
to be influenced by a whole series of experiences? Some-
body once asked me, "What is the most important part of
your legal education?" and I immediately blurted out an an-
swer: "I am a refugee!" And of course, how can I not have
been influenced by the fact that we were antifascists and that
we left Italy because my father had been jailed and beaten in
1923 and he was a democrat with a small "d"; that we were
very, very rich there and came here with nothing because it
was against the law under penalty of death? If I write about
capital punishment or if I make a decision, I am not going to
be writing to push an agenda but, on the other hand, I would






201. E.g., CALABREsi, IDEALs, BELIEFS, A-tITUDES, AND THE LAW, supra note 44, at 3-4.
202. Interview with Guido Calabresi, supra note 197. One might argue that Posner, too,
was an "outsider," who, despite being raised by Jewish immigrant parents (including a com-
munist mother), found his way, like Calabresi did, to Yale. But their situations were quite
different, at least in perception. Posner described to us his sense of things this way:
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In this statement Calabresi uncovers a central struggle of the situation-
ist scholar-he acknowledges that he perceives himself to be a neutral
seeker of truth, and at the same time he realizes that the powerful
situational forces in his life must render him biased. He has uncov-
ered naive realism, but, like all of us, cannot escape it.
It was his situation that allowed him this specific perspective and,
on a more general level, a freedom after graduating from law school
to delve into less system-affirming notions than other contemporary
scholars. Indeed, Calabresi believes, and we agree, that having im-
mense success early in his career freed him from much of the pressure
to produce reassuring dispositionist scholarship within law and
economics. 203
5. Calabresi's Interior Situation.-
a. The Nurturant Parent.-As summarized above, George
Lakoff has demonstrated that the liberal conception of "morality" is
based on the "nurturant parent," which assumes "that the world is ba-
sically good and can be made better and that one must work toward
I have never thought of myself as having been "born an outsider." It is true in aliteral sense that my parents were immigrants, but they came to the U.S. as small
children, spoke flawless English, and were well educated. I attended private
schools in New York (Walden, Columbia Grammar, Ethical Culture) until we
moved to Scarsdale, where I attended fine public schools, and then of course toYale and Harvard. My father was well off and paid for my college and law school
education. (At Yale in my day, scholarship kids had to wait on tables.) I did sensebeingJewish as something of an obstacle, as it was in the 1950s, but I didn't thinkit would be a big one, as of course it hasn't been. I certainly wasn't uncomforta-
ble at Yale or Harvard. I have always thought of myself as leading a privileged
existence.
E-mail from Richard Posner, supra note 37. There were parts of his background that Pos-
ner occasionally found frustrating:
The fly in the ointment-my mother's communist views, and possible CP mem-bership-came solely from the fact that it complicated working for the govern-
ment. As late as 1981, when I was appointed ajudge, I had to explain first to theJustice Department and then to Strom Thurmond's chief investigator that I did
not share my mother's political views! . . . [M]y mother was an admirer of Joe
Stalin!
Thus, while Calabresi continued in his career to be informed by his family's historicalidentity and to look at the world with the skeptical eye of an outsider, Posner saw himself as
a privileged insider and, if anything, hoped to sever his embarrassing familial ties-particu-larly, any association with pro-communist views. For both reasons, it is not surprising that
Posner could embrace the reassuring notions of dispositionism.
203. See Interview with Guido Calabresi, supra note 197 ("Have I been pressured to do it?It's hard to say. When you are as lucky as I am and got where I was as quickly, people can't
very well put pressure [on you] .... I've been criticized ... but I've never felt it effectively
as pressure.").
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that. '20 4 Part of one's duty is to take care of others, an empathetic
approach that requires the ability to "project your consciousness into
other people so that you can feel what they feel. '
20 5 Calabresi falls
into this model rather neatly. Much of his work is dedicated to trying
to step into others' shoes in an effort to gain a more accurate and
complete perspective of the world.
Whereas Posner, in examining the desirability of the reasonable
person standard in tort law, emphasizes the wealth-maximizing conse-
quences of Learned Hand's famous formula (B < PL), Calabresi is
prepared to ask whether the reasonable person standard is itself suffi-
ciently empathetic. He suggests, for instance, that the standard might
be adjusted to include values that women "have traditionally nur-
tured," such as "gentility, gentleness, and perhaps even a bit of reti-
cence in sexual matters."20 6 Putting aside the question of whether
such a reform might reinforce essentializing stereotypes and, thus, do
more harm than good, what is striking about Calabresi is his willing-
ness to think seriously about how the law might be altered to better
reflect the differing perspectives of different groups.
More generally, Calabresi believes that individuals are not to be
left totally on their own, to fend for themselves. Those that require
help should not simply be ignored in lawmaking. Whereas Posner
downplays distributional considerations, Calabresi indicates that they
may be important:
Unless the distribution of income-and therefore goods and
services-is satisfactory, it may be foolish to say that society is
best off if all consumers can choose what they want for them-
selves after seeing what the true costs of their possible
choices are. Instead, prices that falsify the costs of various
items may actually be preferable if, because they falsify, they
lead to a more satisfactory income distribution. Thus, if a
society found that the poor were too poor and that they used
widgets in great quantities, that society might be better off if
widgets were made cheaper (i.e. "subsidized") by not being
made to bear their accident costs, than if they bore all their
costs in full.20 7
204. Bonnie Azab Powell, Framing the Issues: UC Berkeley Professor George Lakoff Tells How
Conservatives Use Language to Dominate Politics, NEWSCENTER, Oct. 27, 2003, at http://
www.berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/
2 0 0 3 /10/27_lakoff.shtml (quoting Lakoff).
205. LAKOFF, supra note 165, at 114.
206. See CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATrTITUDES, AND THE LAw, supra note 44, at 30, 31.
207. THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 4, at 78; see id. at 79 ("[I]t is at least theoreti-
cally possible that a system of allocating accident losses could be found that would be
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To Calabresi, Posner's approach is fundamentally out of touch. The
maximization of wealth, divorced from distributional concerns, fails to
address the "complex of goals ... apparently adhered to by most peo-
ple in a society":
It only necessarily serves "utility" on the most peculiar, not to
say absurd, assumption about the relationship between
wealth and utility, namely, that $1 is as likely to be worth as
much to the rich person as to the poor person. One can be
quite an agnostic about interpersonal comparisons and still
say that that particular assumption is "a" lousier one than
most. It clearly does not serve equality. It might, ironically,
serve a bastardized maximin, but only under a series of un-
certain empirical assumptions, perhaps more commonly
made in the nineteenth century than today, about the trick-
ling down of wealth.2 ° s
Calabresi believes that making the world better involves assisting those
who have less in the world. This does not mean foregoing efficiency
completely as a goal; it means balancing. As he argues, "an appropri-
ate blend of efficiency and distribution is highly instrumental toward,
and closely correlated with, achieving what many would view as a just
society. "209
b. Underlying Motivations.-Overall, the factors thatJohnJost
and his colleagues identified as having the strongest effect on ideolog-
ical positioning-dogmatism and intolerance of ambiguity; lack of
openness to experience; uncertainty avoidance; personal needs for or-
der, structure, and closure; and sense of system threat-seem to be
much less potent in Calabresi than they are in Posner.2 1 ° Of course,
this is not to say that Calabresi seeks uncertainty and risk wherever he
can find them; the point is that as a liberal situationist, Calabresi
"seem[s] to be less troubled by them and less preoccupied with their
management in comparison with conservatives" 21 1 like Posner.
The situationist approach that Calabresi adopts tends to push
against order, structure, and closure. Since the tether lines of disposi-
tionist assumptions are severed, situationist works are often difficult to
grasp and may move in many directions at once. Because hard-to-see
factors are made central, the process of policy analysis is far messier
politically feasible and would accomplish a desired redistribution of income more cheaply
than taxation, or with less misallocation of resources.").
208. Calabresi, Letter to Dworkin, supra note 191, at 556-57.
209. Id. at 558.
210. SeeJost et al., Exceptions That Prove the Rule, supra note 175, at 383, 390.
211. Id. at 383.
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and more complex for situationists. In the end, a situationist work
like The Costs of Accidents can be overwhelming; each page is filled with
observations, responses to possible critiques, and qualifications of
those responses. We, as readers, are constantly having to flip back and
reread. We must contend with dense pages, counterintuitive twists,
and, worst of all, the typical situationist caution: "Not all of these rea-
sons, however, always apply.
212
For a dispositionist scholar like Posner, Calabresi's style in The
Costs of Accidents feels "sinuous and elusive. 21 3 To be sure, situationist
scholarship need not be so difficult, but the aims of clarity, succinct-
ness, and clear organization pose bigger challenges for the situationist
than they do for the dispositionist. That is true not simply because the
situationist has a tougher writing challenge, but also because the situa-
tionist is herself often less troubled by lack of clarity or closure. To
the situationist, framing the question properly or understanding a
problem can be more important than providing a clear answer or so-
lution. 2 4 As Calabresi puts it: "If you asked me what I was most com-
fortable with, it is process and thought and questions and I am much
more skeptical of any answers that I give. I think that is part of the
role of a professor, of an academic-to look into dark places, to ask
questions, to come up with solutions, but to be very skeptical.
215
212. THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 4, at 151.
213. Posner, Book Review, supra note 90, at 642 (also making note of the "excellent if
sometimes protracted discussions of detail with which the book abounds").
214. In the beginning of Tragic Choices, Calabresi and Bobbitt admit to just such an ap-
proach: "We will attempt no simple definition to separate the difficult choice from the
tragic, or the trivial from the difficult . .. we have few prescriptions and no solutions."
CALABRESI & BOBBITT, supra note 44, at 17. In the introduction to Ideals, Beliefs, Attitudes,
and the Law, Calabresi similarly warns us that his hope is not to summarize or offer a solu-
tion but to "draw forth a sufficient number of ideas or impressions so that [he] can then
discuss more generally the role of ideals, attitudes, and beliefs in our legal system." CALA-
BRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, AND THE LAW, supra note 44, at xiv-xv. Even as he ad-
dresses one of "the most complicated, the most searing, issue of beliefs and the law.., the
abortion question," he admits that he does "not hope to come up with any solutions to the
abortion issue, but ... will try to see how the things we will have discussed in the earlier
chapters relate to that particular problem." Id. at xv.
215. Interview with Guido Calabresi, supra note 197. By striving for the most realistic
view, by being cautious about overstating and noting when things have been simplified, it
becomes far more difficult for the author to suggest a single legal rule. Yet, this does not
mean that progress cannot be made. As a situationist, Calabresi works hard to understand
conflicting viewpoints and data, and when he offers up a summary he does not throw up
his hands in despair, nor does he just choose one viewpoint and vigorously defend it for
the sake of closure; instead, he moves forward as far as the constraints allow. In his words,
"[t] o say that the goals [of accident law] are ultimately inconsistent with one another is far
from saying that a change cannot further all of them somewhat, especially if the change is
from a system that developed haphazardly, with none of these goals specifically in mind."
THE CosTs OF ACCIDEN-rs, supra note 4, at 94.
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That approach stands in stark contrast with Posner's. Predictably, in
his book review of The Costs of Accidents, Posner disparages Calabresi
for not reaching any definitive answers on the issue of accident law
regimes:
Calabresi concludes that the fault system is "absurd" and "in-
effective" as a system of accident control. But while asserting
that we could do better, Calabresi proposes no alternative
system. The last part of his book is devoted to an inconclu-
sive discussion of the same proposals for reform with which
he opened. He finds that they cannot be accepted or re-
jected without further study.2 16
For Posner, Calabresi's approach is a threat; it points out the weak-
nesses of existing structures without replacing them with anything
solid.
Inevitably, both the situationist and the dispositionist must con-
tend with "difficult facts"-evidence or ideas that do not square either
with our preconceived notions or our desires. How these difficult
facts are dealt with reveals a lot about a scholar's interior situation.
The situationist embraces such evidence as essential points of study-
facts that are especially important to pay attention to because they are
counterintuitive. The dispositionist ignores or assumes such evidence
away for the sake of maintaining a workable model. The dispositionist
impulse within traditional economic scholarship to round the edges
always troubled Calabresi. In Calabresi's words:
Irrationality in economics simply means something that is
not part of the model that is being used. That is, something
is done which is actually happening and you can either call it
irrational or if it is an analysis of something you can call it
bias. But what it really is is a model that is incomplete and so
it is something that is not explained by the model. The ques-
tion is whether when you see that something doesn't fit, you
try to expand the model and even expand the model in ways
that become a little fuzzy, less definite or if you say because I
can't fit it in the model, well I will ignore it. 2 1 7
216. See Posner, Book Review, supra note 90, at 642 (footnote omitted). Moreover, "Cal-
abresi's work is an uncertain portent, too, not so much because he himself has declined to
move beyond prefatory statements of general principle as because he apparently considers
such statements an adequate substitute for examining how the legal system works." Id at
646. "The book, in short, furnishes a useful perspective on the problem of accident con-
trol but not a predicate for deciding between competing solutions, and this I suspect will
be a frequent characteristic of the new version of legal scholarship exemplified by The Costs
of Accidents; at least it is a major pitfall." Id.
217. Interview with Guido Calabresi, supra note 197.
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Calabresi, as a situationist, is less interested in some ideal image of
reality-what he refers to as the "economist's perfect world"2 1
8
-than
he is in the real world. 19 Calabresi emphasizes that economic theory
(just like dispositionism more generally) can be a helpful tool-that it
can make the complex seem simple and can help provide answers to
difficult questions22°-but that it also has the potential to be a huge
limiting agent:
Teaching economics [to undergraduates] as I was doing
throughout law school, I kept saying to myself there are
some things in economics which don't speak to the world as
it is, and many of them are the result of assumptions that
economists make which make life easier for them but are not
necessary as such. They are contingent. They are ones that
are easy, and so they do it, but they get in the way of answer-
ing questions. This is a long way around of saying that it put
me in the position of saying . . .early, that it isn't just using
economic theory to explain, contradict, or reaffirm legal
rules that a legal economist should be doing ... that's part of
it ... but the other is to use the situations of the real world,
which we, as lawyers, are much more apt to see than to un-
derstand, to say this isn't explained by economic theory, and
yet it is there and yet it needs to be explained. Is there any
reason why economic theory can't modify itself so that these
things can be explained?
221
The situationist impulse is not only to be open to all the facts-includ-
ing difficult ones-but also to seek them out. It is, in Calabresi's
words, to look in the "dark places" where other people would not
look. For Calabresi, this eagerness to discover new perspectives seems
218. THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 4, at 60.
219. A good example of Calabresi's contemporary focus comes in his discussion of the
merits of the fault system:
The fault system may have arisen in a world where one injurer and one victim
were the most that society could handle adequately, and in such a world it proba-
bly was a fairly good mixed system .... [But that world] is not today's world.
Today accidents must be viewed not as incidental events linking one victim with
one injurer, but as a more general societal problem.
Id. at 307-08.
220. For instance, Calabresi points out that "making models is useful because it shows
you whether there are empty boxes, as in 'The View of the Cathedral.'" Interview with
Guido Calabresi, supra note 197 (referring to Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed,
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv.
1089 (1972)); see also Guido Calabaresi, Neologisms Revisited, 64 MD. L. REv. 736, 752-53
(2005).
221. Interview with Guido Calabresi, supra note 197.
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intuitive. In fact, he finds it odd that others in legal academia manage
to cling to dispositionist notions:
Making that leap, I would have thought, should come easy to
a lawyer who thinks in terms of peripheral vision. One of the
qualities we think of as lawyers is being able to see very
broadly. Things that don't look important to other people
and how they fit. How something that someone else thinks is
different, you can make look the same. And how something
that other people think looks the same you can make look
different. That is almost the game of law. And that's some-
thing from earliest childhood I always did. Looking back on
it, it was something I was good at, that I liked to do .... I
wasn't going to stop doing it just because I was doing eco-
nomics. And instead, the economist has always tended to the
other thing-to simplify, to structure, to make a model, to
make it easy .... 222
At the same time that Calabresi is confident that his complexifying
approach moves things closer to the truth, he realizes that the disposi-
tionist view has its advantages:
I have been very aware of the fact that it is much easier to
have disciples, and to have many people do exactly what you
are doing, if you make things simple and you leave out all of
the contingencies, all the complexities, all of the things that
the model cannot encompass. And I have always been aware
of it-I expected it and then I saw it, very early on. That
people would be quoting and copying-you know, you put
things in the same meat grinder and it comes out with the
same meat. I saw that, but I have never been tempted by it
because it didn't seem right .... 223
Ultimately, by being situationist, his scholarship is bound to be less
popular. 224 As he explains, out of all the articles that he has authored,
The Cathedral
is the one that has been cited most, and relied on most, and
has had the most influence, because it is the most simple-
minded .... It's been so easy for people to take off on it
because you can put everything in little boxes and it is fun to
do that. But the world is much harder than that.22 5
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. See id. ("I have never had a review of something that I wrote at the time that I wrote
it which was totally favorable. It has always been respectful, because I was doing some
things which were clearly new, but puzzled. But puzzled because it didn't quite fit.").
225. Id.
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Situationists, in short, think outside the boxes.
III. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: THE FORGOTTEN PATH OF THE COSTS
OF ACCIDENTS
In the end, there is no mistaking the influence of economics on
Guido Calabresi's The Costs of Accidents. And it is no accident that the
book itself is considered a foundational piece in law and economics.
Calabresi largely accepts the dispositionist view of the human actor
common to most economic scholarship-indeed, central to most legal
theory and law.2 26 Still, as we have argued, the book is remarkably
sensitive to situation and stands out as an exception among legal-eco-
nomic texts published in the last three-and-a-half decades.
What we have hoped to demonstrate, then, is a vital distinction
within law and economics. The Costs of Accidents stands at the thresh-
old of a thirty-five-year journey. Calabresi, as a pioneer in the field,
offered a distinct track to follow.22 7 Yet, at the fork in the road, the
mass of law and economics scholars set off in the other direction-
one that led, in time, to a far more dispositionist landscape than the
passage Calabresi started us toward.2 28 It was Posner's route that be-
came the beaten path.
The evidence of those two general paths and the fact that one has
been far less traveled than the other raises several questions that we
have only begun to explore in this piece. First, why did dispositionism
win out-at least thus far?2 29 Second, why were situationist accounts
226. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra note 14, at 157-76 (discussing
the fundamentals of dispositionism).
227. See Posner, Book Review, supra note 90, at 636 (suggesting that Calabresi's work
mark[s] a new direction in legal scholarship").
228. More recently, some economists and legal economists have, without seeing the con-
nection to Calabresi, begun to tread back toward the path that Calabresi broke.
229. In his recent reassessment of The Costs of Accidents, Posner suggests that the reason
that the vision articulated in the book has not carried the day is that it lost out in the
marketplace of ideas; in effect, it did not gain adherents because it was less close to the
truth. As Posner writes:
[T]hirty-four years after his book was published, and thirty-seven years after [Cala-
bresi] predicted that the fault system "is so poor a system of compensation that it
bids fair to be replaced by the worst possible general system of market deterrence,
namely generalized social insurance," the system remains essentially unchanged.
To the extent it has changed, it has not been in the direction of Calabresi's pro-
posals for reform.
Posner, A Reassessment, supra note 114, at 20-21 (footnote omitted). For Posner, the dis-
positionist approach to law and economics was superior to the alternatives, not only within
law and economics, but without. He misses the possibility that there may be hidden influ-
ences in our exteriors and interiors causing distortions in the market for the truth, and
situationally advantaging the dispositionist account. That is, he again overlooks the situa-
tion. See generally Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 14, passim (arguing that the
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of the sort offered by Calabresi ever countenanced among legal aca-
demics? Third, how have commentators from outside of legal
academia confronted the sorts of situationist arguments offered by
Calabresi and others regarding the proper place of accident law?
The answers to those questions are important because they shed
light on a range of policy debates well beyond the field of law and
economics and the issues posed by tort law. In other work, we investi-
gate how the backlash against situationism and the promotion of dis-
positionism has provided a barrier to entry into the marketplace of
ideas and policy discourse for situationists. In essence, the story of the
last thirty years, since The Costs of Accidents was published, has been a
story of market failures. What has made Posner popular is what ren-
ders his conclusions unreliable. What has made Calabresi less influen-
tial is what makes his outlook and approach worth emulating.
The prospect for the future is hopeful. For the first time, eco-
nomics and law and economics seem to be slowly catching up with
Guido Calabresi. The rise of economic behavioralism and related ap-
proaches may presage a return to that situationist road not taken. Al-
though vines hang menacingly across the way, the track is still visible.
It is our hope that rumors of the demise of legal economic situation-
ism have been greatly exaggerated.
success of dispositionist law and economics has been largely the consequence of situational
forces).
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